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NEGOTIATING SOCIAL CHANGE: BACKSTORY BEHIND THE
REPEAL OF DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL
Linell A. Letendre
and Hal Abramson*
Abstract
This Article is about negotiating social change in the largest U.S.
institution, the Military and its five Services. Inducing social change in
any institution and society is notoriously difficult when change requires
overcoming clashing personal values among stakeholders. And, in this
negotiation over the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT), clashing
values over open service by gays and lesbians were central to the conflict.
In response to President Obama’s call to repeal DADT, the Secretary
of Defense selected a Working Group to undertake studies, surveys and
focus groups to inform the debate. During the nine-month process of
gathering a massive amount of information, the Working Group did much
more than inform. Its process cultivated buy-in by resistant Service
members to the largest shift in social values in the military since racial
integration in 1948.
This study examines how the Pentagon’s Working Group process
contributed to the change and prepared stakeholders for implementation
in an Article jointly written by Brigadier General Letendre, Dean of the
Faculty at U.S. Air Force Academy, who served as the legal advisor to
the Co-Chair of the Working Group, and Professor Hal Abramson, an
academic and practitioner in the field of dispute resolution who is an
award-winning author.
The authors use theoretical negotiation benchmarks to explain and
examine choices made by the Working Group while assessing the process
against the same benchmarks. While this Article is joint, it is enriched by
Brig. Gen. Linell A. Letendre is the Dean of the Faculty, United States Air Force
Academy and former Permanent Professor of the Department of Law, United States Air Force
Academy. She served on the Pentagon’s 2010 DADT Working Group as legal advisor to CoChair General Ham. The views in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense. Professor Hal Abramson, Touro
College, Jacob. D. Fuchsberg Law Center, has published extensively in the fields of negotiations,
mediation, and international conflict resolution and visited at the U.S. Air Force Academy for
eleven months to help build its program on negotiations.
We want to thank Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship and Professor of Law Rodger
Citron and Professor of Law Andrea Schneider and Director of Marquette’s Law School Dispute
Resolution Program for their valuable comments and feedback on late drafts of this Article.
We want to give special recognition to 1st Lt. John Fredericks who in his final year at USAFA
worked closely with the two authors when they put together a plenary program for the annual
ABA Dispute Resolution Conference in April 2018. John drafted a report with footnotes that
became the foundation for the ABA program and a valuable starting point for this Article. We
also want to acknowledge the superb research assistance by Touro Law School student, Nancy
Gallagher, whose research skills and attention to detail were fully tested, and she excelled.
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short commentaries by each author, in which Brigadier General Letendre
offers an insider’s view at key points while Professor Abramson offers
his observations on key choices. Ultimately this Article is a case study of
a complex multiparty process with lessons on negotiating social change.
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................159
I.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT (ORIGINS OF DADT) ..........................162

II.

DOD WORKING GROUP MANDATE .........................................169

III.

NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK ...................................................172

IV.

STAKEHOLDERS ......................................................................173
A. Identifying and Grouping Stakeholders by
Position (Not Interests) ..................................................173
B. Stakeholders’ Roles and Concerns .................................175
C. Transition to Next Sections.............................................181

V.

WHY NEGOTIATE? THE BATNA ............................................182

VI.

INFORMATION-GATHERING ....................................................186
A. Research, Surveys, and Studies ......................................186
B. Critique of Information-Gathering .................................190
C. Overcoming Obstacles and Cultivating Buy-in ..............191
D. Risk Assessment Panel....................................................198
E. Partial One-Text Procedure ...........................................200
F. Information-Gathering Conclusion ................................202

VII.

RESOLUTION (COMMITMENT) MET INTERESTS .......................202
A. Commitment by Co-Chairs of Working Group...............203
B. Interests that Needed to be Met ......................................204
C. How These Interests were Met in the
Report and Plan..............................................................205
D. Commitment by Congress ...............................................207

VIII.

LESSONS .................................................................................209

Appendix A-Working Group Directive and Terms of Reference1 ......216
Appendix B-Negotiation Framework ..................................................221
1. This appendix was originally published by the Department of Defense and is being
reproduced here with the Department of Defense’s permission.

2022]

NEGOTIATING SOCIAL CHANGE

159

Appendix C-Information-Gathering Surveys and Studies ...................228
Appendix D-Small Focus Group Script2..............................................241
Appendix E-Survey Design3 ................................................................249
INTRODUCTION
The proposal to repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) was a quixotic
initiative to open military service to gays and lesbians. It seemed destined
for failure. The repeal was advanced by a newly elected and young
Democratic president, Barack Obama, who had no military experience.
He was opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one of the most esteemed
defenders of the military, Senator John McCain, among other formidable
opponents.4 The repeal also involved more than weighing the pros and
cons of changing a law; it required parties to confront a momentous social
change. In less than a year from the time the President called for repeal
in his State of the Union address in January 2010,5 DADT was repealed,
and gays and lesbians could serve openly in the military.6 How did this
happen against these odds? What are the lessons for future social reform
efforts?
This Article explores how multiparty engagement through focus
groups and surveys can accelerate social change ahead of wide public
acceptance. The repeal implicated a value-based choice that triggered
deeply held conflicting views regarding the impact of gay and lesbian
service on military effectiveness, a central military decision-making
standard. No one disputed the qualifications of gays and lesbians.7 This
dispute was fueled by conflicting beliefs on how people ought to behave
and what is right and wrong.8 This value-based conflict distressed
2. This appendix was originally published by Westat and is being reproduced here with
Westat’s and the Department of Defense’s permission.
3. This appendix was originally published by Westat and is being reproduced here with
Westat’s and the Department of Defense’s permission.
4. See infra Part V (listing resisters to repeal).
5. Press Release, White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in State
of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-state-union-address [https://perma.cc/9LRP-XGTQ] [hereinafter 2010
State of the Union].
6. The repeal statute was adopted by Congress in December 2011 and became effective in
September 2012. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515
(2010).
7. See infra Part II (describing the origins of DADT).
8. See Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni et al., Barriers to Resolution in Ideologically Based
Negotiations: The Role of Values and Institutions, 27 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 41, 43 (2002) (“In
contrast to other negotiation domains, such as simple economic exchanges like commodity
purchases, the issues in ideologically based conflicts are very closely associated with negotiators’
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Military leaders who feared that repeal would negatively affect military
effectiveness.
Value-based conflicts are among the most difficult ones to resolve.9
Professor Lawrence Susskind, an eminent MIT scholar and practitioner,
describes the dynamics of value conflicts as fractious with intransigent
parties:
When values and identities are at stake, parties are less
willing to soften their demands, even if doing so could lead
to trades that would satisfy other interests they might have.
Such situations tend to heighten defensiveness, distrust, and
alienation. Feelings of anger or hurt may intensify,
prompting parties to be more judgmental and certain that the
other party acted inappropriately. Such situations may lead
to personal attacks as well. Parties may feel there’s a great
deal at stake, causing them to harden their commitment to
particular principles or to worry that any agreement they
reach might set a bad precedent. Overall, there may be a
greater sense that such disputes are intractable, since values
often appear to be incompatible and mutually
exclusive . . . .10
This story of social reform that required overcoming value differences
is conveyed through the lens of a negotiation process and uses negotiation
theory to explain what happened and what was effective. This successful
process, however, was structured and implemented by leaders who were
not formally trained as negotiators. They did not consider the techniques
championed in the literature and taught in schools and training programs.
They did what made sense to them given their considerable experiences
identities. Individuals’ positions in ideologically based-negotiation typically emerge from beliefs
at the core of why they are—what they believe about the reality of world, how the world behaves,
and what fundamental rights people have; their notions of justice, and what they think is right and
wrong.”).
9. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND AND JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 204 (1987) (encouraging parties to
reframe disputes to not focus on sacrosanct values if possible because value conflicts, like
negotiations over handgun regulations for example, are not amenable to consensus building);
CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING
CONFLICT 110–11, 159 (4th ed. 2014) (presenting the Circle of Conflict that covers five causes of
conflict, including intractable value conflicts); HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION
REPRESENTATION: ADVOCATING AS A PROBLEM-SOLVER 160, 254–55 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing
the challenge of overcoming value conflicts).
10. Lawrence Susskind & Adam Z. Rose, How to Negotiate When Values are at Stake,
NEGOT. (Oct. 1, 2010), https://cbi.org/article/2010/how-to-negotiate-when-values-are-at-stake/
[https://perma.cc/XK77-SCU7] (exploring this daunting challenge in an article published the
same year as the proposal for repeal was advanced and posing the same value conflict raised by
DADT repeal in a workplace conflict over a diversity campaign that included a positive poster
about a gay employee and another employee posted bible verses condemning homosexuality).
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and mission. This is not a case study of how theory leads practice; instead,
the theory explains the practice choices.
This story emerged by happenstance when the co-authors met at the
U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA). Air Force Brigadier General
Letendre, when serving as Colonel and head of the department that taught
law at USAFA, selected Professor Abramson to visit for eleven months
to help build USAFA’s negotiation program. During monthly lunches
and breakfasts, Professor Abramson learned the backstory of the repeal
from someone who was directly involved as part of the Pentagon’s
DADT Working Group. Brigadier General Letendre learned that the
backstory was a multiparty negotiation process. Together, the co-authors
present this story of one of the largest and most successful organizationwide reforms in the history of the United States military.
It was easy to miss this multiparty negotiation process, given the
directive of the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates. He set up a highlevel working group at the Pentagon for the limited purpose of studying
the risks of repeal and developed an implementation plan if there were a
repeal.11 The Working Group was instructed to not take a position for or
against repeal.12 Its role was limited to informing the discussion.13 The
formal negotiations, although to be informed by the Working Group’s
studies, would take place in Congress, where multiparty negotiations are
part of its daily business.
Even though the Working Group was instructed to only inform the
discussions, it functioned as a de facto facilitator of a negotiation
process.14 In addition to generating a mountainous amount of
information, the Working Group identified stakeholders and their
interests as well as engaged stakeholders for and against repeal in
multiple ways. Moreover, it facilitated discussions that produced a
weighty and persuasive result, a robust report and a repeal
implementation plan by the Co-Chairs that met many of the stakeholders’
interests. This result was affected by looming judicial decisions that were
positioned to swiftly supersede the negotiation process.
This successful multiparty negotiation process, which contributed to
a historic cultural change in one of the most vital and complex institutions
in the U.S., offers lessons on negotiating social change that this Article
examines and highlights.

11. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” 153–56 (2010) [hereinafter DADT
REPORT].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part 3 (discussing the DoD Working Group Mandate and the ways in which
the Working Group served as a de facto facilitator).
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In order to take advantage of the different perspectives of each of the
co-authors, we added separate commentary throughout this Article under
the initials LAL or HA. Brigadier General Letendre brings the insider
perspective and experience of a uniformed member of the military,
accrued over twenty-nine years, and a member of the Pentagon’s working
group on the DADT repeal and legal advisor to the Co-Chair. Professor
Abramson brings the perspective and experiences of a dispute resolution
scholar and practitioner for about the same number of years. We hope
that the occasional departure from “we” to individual commentary
enriches this Article.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT (ORIGINS OF DADT)
From today’s perspective, the adoption of the DADT policy in 1994
as a monumental advancement for gays and lesbians in the military may
be a surprising view. DADT permitted gays and lesbians to serve only if
they did not tell anyone.15 This glowing characterization may seem
unfounded if not offensive, but it is only with a historical perspective in
mind that the significance of DADT repeal, as a landmark social reform,
can be understood and appreciated.
The story of DADT adoption begins with a campaign promise by
then-candidate Bill Clinton in 1992 to open up military service for gays
and lesbians.16 Within days of assuming office, President Clinton learned
the challenges of doing so from the vigorous opposition of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and then-Chairman, General Colin Powell.17
In an Oval Office meeting only five days after becoming President,
the Joint Chiefs expressed the military’s “solid wall of opposition to
lifting the ban.”18 Powell, the President’s chief military advisor at the
time, argued that the prohibition should remain in place as it aligned with
the Uniform Military Code of Justice statute that forbade “sodomy.”19
Powell also argued that lifting the ban would be unrealistic to implement,
as there was no “absolute right to privacy” in the military, where Service
15. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993) (repealed 2010).
16. See Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 1992, at
320; Eric Schmitt, Challenging the Military: In Promising to End Ban on Homosexuals, Clinton
Is Confronting a Wall of Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1992, at A1.
17. See Josh Gerstein, Clinton, Powell Talked Gays in Military, POLITICO (Oct. 10, 2014),
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/clinton-documents-gays-in-the-military-111784
[https://perma.cc/WMM9-FU2L]; RAND, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
POLICY: AN UPDATE OF RAND’S 1993 STUDY 40 (2010), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
monographs/MG1056.html [https://perma.cc/4YAW-QAJB] [hereinafter 1993 RAND Update].
18. See 1993 RAND UPDATE, supra note 17, at 42. President Clinton was inaugurated on
January 20, 1993.
19. Powell: Military ‘Struggling’ over Gays, WASH. POST, https://www.washington
post.com/archive/politics/1992/12/01/powell-military-struggling-over-gays/1e92238a-c117-420
3-acd7-fad60bf96ea8/ [https://perma.cc/4QU5-KDU3] (last visited May 1, 2022).
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members often shared close quarters.20 He was concerned whether the
military would be able to force straight members to room or be in close
quarters with their homosexual counterparts.21
While Powell’s views may be antiquated and repugnant to many
today, the political and social climate of the eighties and early nineties
was one fraught with apprehension of openly gay Service members,
fueled by the emergence of HIV/AIDS.22 The issue was controversial,
with public opinion almost evenly divided: 43% of Americans approved
of lifting the ban, 50% disapproved, and 7% had no opinion.23 This
division and these fears had to be confronted by Clinton when trying to
open the military for all people, regardless of sexual orientation.24 Indeed,
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman noted at the time that lifting
the ban “would involve the most radical change to the social fabric of the
American military since President Harry S. Truman ordered the army
integrated in 1948.”25
Even though President Clinton did not leave this first meeting with
the support he wanted, he struck a deal for going the next step with Joint
Chiefs and the Senate leadership that opposed lifting the ban. Clinton
issued a directive to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, dated January 29,
1993, to draft an executive order by July 15th that would end
discrimination based on sexual orientation in the military while applying
rigorous sexual conduct standards to maintain unit cohesion (military
effectiveness).26 The executive order was accompanied with an order to
conduct a six-month in-depth study by a comprehensive military working
group.27 The working group was obliged to address any potential issues
20. Russell Berman, The Awkward Clinton-Era Debate Over ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’
ATLANTIC (Oct. 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/10/the-awkwardclinton-era-debate-over-dont-ask-dont-tell/381374/ [https://perma.cc/CA7K-SYJF].
21. See id.
22. Lindsay Mahowald, LGBTQ+ Military Members and Veterans Face Economic,
Housing, and Health Insecurities, AMERICANPRESS.ORG (Apr. 28, 2022), https://www.american
progress.org/article/lgbtq-military-members-and-veterans-face-economic-housing-and-health-in
securities/ [https://perma.cc/KW2N-B7LH].
23. Lydia Saad, Gallup Vault: Issue of Gays in Military Split Americans in 1993, GALLUP
(July 28, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/vault/214745/gallup-vault-issue-gays-military-splitamericans-1993.aspx [https://perma.cc/4XRX-B5CS].
24. RAND, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: OPTIONS
242–71 (1993), https://rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR323.html
AND ASSESSMENT
[https://perma.cc/NCQ6-2MDY].
25. 1993 RAND UPDATE, supra note 17, at 42 (citing Thomas L. Friedman, To the Mat;
Now Clinton Decides Which Promises Came First, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1992), https://www.ny
times.com/1992/11/15/weekinreview/to-the-mat-now-clinton-decides-which-promises-camefirst.html [https://perma.cc/7B6P-C9TX]).
26. Press Conference, President Bill Clinton, Press Conference on “Gays in the Military”
(Jan. 29, 1993), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-29-1993press-conference-gays-military [https://perma.cc/C3AW-FCKY].
27. Id.
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with implementing a plan and to include an interim measure that would
remove from enlistment applications the question about sexual
orientation.28
The opposition that Clinton faced during his first meeting with the
Joint Chiefs mirrored the opposition he encountered with key members
of Congress. The pushback endured for the full six months during which
the study was conducted and continued through later Congressional
hearings on DADT.29 Reports afterwards highlighted the level of military
resistance to repealing the ban. A later 1993 Working Group Report
“concluded that homosexuality remained inconsistent with military
service, and that the presence in the military of individuals identified as
homosexuals would have a significantly adverse effect on both the
readiness of the force and unit cohesion.”30 A Department of Defense
(DoD) commissioned report by RAND later found that “the prevailing
attitudes of both the leadership and many military personnel are hostile
to any change” and “that hostile opinion toward homosexuals is prevalent
in the American military . . . .”31
Due to the strongly divided public opinion and resistance within the
military, Secretary of Defense Aspin contracted with RAND’s National
Defense Research Institute to undertake a study that would offer policy
options.32 After studying prior DoD racial integration experiences as well
as how foreign militaries and domestic fire and police departments
handled integration of gays and lesbians,33 RAND’s study explored
different solutions.34 Ultimately, RAND recommended a policy that it
concluded would offer a realistic and consistent approach towards lifting
the restriction while maintaining the high level of standards and conduct
necessary for combat effectiveness and unit cohesion.35 The RAND
Report concluded that
Only one policy option was found to be consistent with our
research, within the directive, and within itself. That policy
would consider sexual orientation, by itself, as “not
germane” to determining who may serve in the military and

28. Id.
29. Thomas L. Friedman, Gay Rights in the Military: Chiefs Back Clinton on Gay-Troop
Plan; President Admits Revised Policy Isn’t Perfect, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993, at A16
[hereinafter Gay Rights in the Military]; 1993 RAND UPDATE, supra note 17, at 43.
30. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 21.
31. RAND, supra note 24, at 3, 32.
32. Id. at iii.
33. Id. §§ 3–5.
34. Id. §§ 12, 13.
35. Id. at iii.
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would establish clear, strictly enforced standards of conduct
for all military personnel.36
The proposed “not germane” policy focused on a conduct-based
approach for opening service to gays and lesbians.37 The approach
concentrated on professional conduct and rules and neutralized sexual
orientation as a consideration.38 So long as people followed the code of
conduct, sexual orientation should not matter.39
The RAND proposal rejected the option of treating homosexuals as a
protected class (an affirmative action-type status) and attempting to
change majority attitudes.40 Instead, it favored a policy that treated
homosexuals under existing regulations.41 It viewed this approach as one

36. Id. at 333.
37. RAND, supra note 24, at 32–36.
38. See id. at 34–35.
39. When reaching this “not germane” approach as the best policy, RAND’s focus groups,
as well as a LA Times survey and other research on this subject, did not consider the capabilities
of homosexuals. Id. at 213, 333. The RAND study found that most people did not think that sexual
orientation affected a person’s ability to do their job, nor would it affect unit effectiveness. Id. at
333. As explained in the 1993 RAND report:
That policy would consider sexual orientation, by itself, as “not germane” to
determining who may serve in the military and would establish clear, strictly
enforced standards of conduct for all military personnel. This single standard of
conduct would be neutral regarding gender and sexual orientation. Decisions on
military accession and retention would be based on individual qualifications and
behavior, not on a person’s category. Homosexuals would not be treated as a
separate class under this option.
....
. . . Military experience with blacks and women argues for a simple policy under
which homosexuals are treated no differently in terms of work assignments,
living situations, or promotability. Indeed, the documented capabilities of
homosexuals to perform all military tasks enable the policy to be simple.
....
. . . Of the 74 percent who disapproved [of repealing DADT], 63 percent opposed
sharing quarters and facilities with homosexuals, 40 percent said homosexuality
was immoral, 28 percent cited contribution to the spread of AIDS, and 21 percent
said it was against their religious views. Fifteen percent felt that homosexuals
were less reliable in a combat situation, and a total of 9 percent of respondents
chose all other reasons, such as morale, causing conflict, cost of facilities, threats
of violence, and wanting equal rights as married persons (Item G-19).
Id. at 213, 333, 380. In contrast, when the military considered whether women could serve, there
was still “continuing strong doubts about capability.” RAND, supra note 24, at 32.
40. Id. at 33.
41. RAND, supra note 24, at 33.
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“likely to be more successful for the American military.”42 This option
would formally end discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
while assuring military order and discipline. It would not endorse a “gay
lifestyle” nor require any special accommodation because homosexuals
would be considered as individuals, not a special class.43 If sexual
orientation would not be a factor for eligibility, then emphasis could be
placed on conduct and implementing uniform standards that applied to
all military personnel.44
One of the benefits of this approach would be that it would require no
significant changes in military policies or law, including the law central
to military service, the Uniform Code of Military Justice.45 The essential
elements for the policy would include strict enforcement of existing rules
that govern professional conduct and sexual harassment and would
eliminate DoD directives regulating private sexual behavior among
adults.46 Prosecutorial policy also would be revised to apply only to nonconsensual sexual acts.47 The overall approach would avoid the larger
issues of whether to recognize homosexual marriages or provide various
benefits to homosexual partners.48
The RAND approach offered Clinton a compromise between his
promise to outright eliminate the service ban and the forceful opposition
from Congress, especially the House of Representatives.49 Rationalizing
that some progress was better than none, Clinton moved forward with the
DADT policy. No one would be allowed to openly ask recruits or active
personnel about their sexual orientation (Don’t Ask), and any gay recruits
or lesbian recruits or personnel would be required to keep their sexual
orientation private (Don’t Tell). Additionally, the ‘Don’t Pursue’ part of
the policy would prohibit investigations into a person’s sexual orientation
without just cause from higher-ranking officials.50
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at xviii.
46. Id. at 34.
47. RAND, supra note 24, at 34.
48. Id. at 35–38.
49. The House had already voted down two previous amendments to lift the ban, with one
being more lenient and the other more restrictive than what the compromise would offer. See
Jeffrey T. Spoeri, The Pennsylvania Avenue Tug-of-War: The President Versus Congress Over
the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 175, 176 (1994).
Clinton could allow Congress to vote on his original unconditional proposal to end the fifty-year
ban, though it would most likely be voted down, again. Or, he could endorse a compromise that
would align with his goals and had a good chance for approval. This second option would
eventually become known as the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue directive. See RAND, supra
note 24, at 43.
50. RAND, supra note 24, at 43–45.
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While this compromise was not the outright repeal that Clinton had
sought, it did represent progress. It was better than the old policy that
prohibited any gay or lesbian person from enlisting or serving, that
allowed officers to inquire about sexual orientation during the
recruitment process, and that authorized investigations into alleged
misconduct for violating the ban. In contrast, the new policy granted
relatively greater protections. It permitted gay and lesbian persons to
serve in the armed forces under one onerous condition, so long as they
did not reveal their sexual orientation. Of course, they also had to follow
the strict guidelines that applied to personal and professional conduct for
maintaining unit cohesion and combat effectiveness.
The compromise garnered the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, with Powell supporting it.51 He thought it would enhance
military effectiveness by removing recent uncertainties and friction.52
However, the compromise, even with support from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, was still met with disapproval by leaders of both political parties.53
Both sides were ultimately left frustrated. Conservatives were
unhappy about altering existing policy; progressives were unhappy that
Clinton reneged on his campaign promise.54 Clinton himself recognized
that this was “not a perfect solution” or “identical with some of my own
goals.”55 He added that “It certainly will not please everyone—perhaps
not anyone—and clearly not those who hold the most adamant opinions
on either side of the issue.”56 He viewed it, however, as “a substantial
advance” over the half century ban and concluded it struck “a sensible
balance between the rights of the individuals and the needs of the
military.”57
With the support of the Joint Chiefs and after a grueling and
tumultuous six months of studies and debate, President Clinton officially
put forth the DADT statute.58 It was adopted on October 1, 199359 and
included a statutory finding that offers a stark reminder of the level of
resistances that had to be overcome before DADT could be repealed in
2011. When adopting DADT, Congress found that: “The presence in the
armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage
in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high
51. John Lancaster, Senators Find Clinton Policy on Gays in Military Confusing, WASH.
POST, July 21, 1993, at A12.
52. Id.
53. Gay Rights in the Military, supra note 29, at A1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Dont-AskDont-Tell [https://perma.cc/X4NB-YKSY] (last visited May 3, 2022).
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standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are
the essence of military capability.”60
Following the DADT enactment, it was immediately attacked in the
Courts that heard cases from Service members who claimed to be
wronged by the new law.61 Civil rights groups including the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund led the legal challenges.62 In Able v. United States,63 one
of the first cases to be tried, DADT was challenged as unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause.64 This argument prevailed in the trial
court, as a landmark and short-lived victory, until reversed by an appeals
court.65 Able was the first of multiple DADT legal challenges as will be
further considered in the Part on the Best Alternatives to a Negotiated
Agreement (BATNA) (alternatives to negotiated resolutions).66
In the years following DADT passage, over thirteen thousand Service
members were discharged under the policy.67 These administrative
discharges occurred despite continued studies attacking the 1993
Congressional findings. One such study, published in the American
Psychological Association Review, stated that “empirical evidence fails
to show that sexual orientation is germane to any aspect of military
effectiveness including unit cohesion, morale, recruitment and
retention.”68 In 2005, the Government Accountability Office reported
that the cost of implementing DADT included $95.4 million in recruiting
costs.69
After President Obama’s election in 2008, the new President and the
Democratic Party that held a majority in both Houses of Congress sought
repeal of DADT. During President Obama’s State of the Union address

60. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993) (repealed 2010).
61. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); McVeigh v.
Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998); Witt v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 444 F.
Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Wash. 2006); Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th
Cir. 2011).
62. ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Is Challenged in Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1994, at 18.
63. 847 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
64. See, e.g., id. at 1038; ACLU History: Challenging Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, ACLU (Sept.
1, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-history-challenging-dont-ask-dont-tell [https://perma
.cc/Q63M-ULRF].
65. See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d at 628.
66. See infra Part V.
67. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 32.
PSYCH.
ASS’N,
68. Sexual
Orientation
&
Military
Service,
AM.
https://www.apa.org/about/policy/military-archived [https://perma.cc/S2RD-FUHA] (last visited
Aug. 5, 2021).
69. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-299, MILITARY PERSONNEL: FINANCIAL
COSTS AND LOSS OF CRITICAL SKILLS DUE TO DOD’S HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY CANNOT BE
COMPLETELY ESTIMATED 30 (2005).
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on January 27, 2010, he announced that he would pursue repeal.70 Less
than five weeks later, Secretary of Defense Gates established a
Comprehensive Review Working Group (Working Group) whose task
was to assess the impact of repeal and recommend any changes necessary
for implementation if repeal occurred.71 The Working Group’s vital role
in the repeal process and its scope of responsibilities will be examined in
the next Part.72
LAL: I was a Fourth Class Cadet (freshman) at the U.S. Air Force
Academy when the DADT debate raged in the spring of 1993. While I
certainly had gay and lesbian classmates, few trusted others enough to
reveal their sexual orientation . . . and for good reason. The environment
was hostile toward open service; “queer jokes” were the norm. Flashforward seventeen years, to when I was a field grade officer (an O-4) and
an Air Force JAG and I received an urgent call from the top Air Force
Judge Advocate, Lt Gen Jack Rives. “Mr. Johnson wants you to be a
scribe for the DADT report. Interested?” That same day, the Secretary
of Defense announced the establishment of a working group to the Senate
Armed Services Committee, and I started a new job. Jeh Johnson was
selected as Co-Chair of the Working Group.
II. DOD WORKING GROUP MANDATE
Secretary of Defense Gates established an “intra-Department, interService working group to conduct a comprehensive review of the issues
associated with a repeal of the [DADT] law.”73 Gates’ directive was a
response to the President’s appeal to Congress to repeal DADT and the
President’s directive to the Pentagon “to consider how best to implement
a repeal.”74 Gates explained that the Department owed the President “an
assessment of the implications of such a repeal, should it occur.”75
Gates appointed as co-chairs two senior DoD officials, a highly
regarded civilian and then General Counsel to the Defense Department,
Jeh Johnson, and an Army General with 37 years of distinguished service,
General Carter Ham.
The Working Group performed a central role in the public and private
debates as Congress moved toward decision day when members would
vote for or against repeal. The Working Group’s assigned role was not as
70. 2010 State of the Union, supra note 5.
71. See infra app. A.
72. See infra Part II.
73. See infra app. A (emphasis added).
74. Mike Mount, Gates Outlines Study on Letting Gays Serve Openly in the Military, CNN
(Mar. 2, 2010, 9:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/03/02/gates.gays.military/index.html
[https://perma.cc/P2U2-TAN4].
75. Id.
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a facilitator although as a practical matter, it did function as a de facto
one.76
That practical role was evident from the Defense Secretary’s
Directive, starting with what it did not direct the Working Group to do. It
was not instructed to answer the ultimate question—whether DADT
ought to be repealed, an exclusion that spurred the Working Group
toward a more non-partisan, neutral role. The Directive also instructed
the Working Group to engage stakeholders and supply information that
policymakers needed to make an informed decision, instructions that
spurred the Working Group toward a facilitative role.77
In particular, Gates directed the Working Group to “assess and
consider the impacts, if any, a change in the law would have on military
readiness, military effectiveness and unit cohesion, and how to best
manage such impacts during implementation.”78 He also directed the
Working Group to systematically engage the force, other key
stakeholders, and Members of Congress, and to carry out the entire effort
“in a professional, thorough, and dispassionate matter.”79 The directive
included a detailed Terms of Reference that covered Objectives and
Scope, Methodology, Deliverables, and Support. He also imposed a short
deadline of only nine months to submit a report.80
LAL: We understood at the outset that we were NOT answering
“should” the law be repealed; that was a political question. We were
answering “could” and if so, “how.” For nine months, I carried with me
the two-page directive and pulled it out multiple times a day for vector
checks as we explored each issue at hand. By the time the final report
was published, my directive was wrinkled and worn, but it never once
failed to provide guidance.
Second only to the SecDef’s directive was a succinct order by CoChair General Ham. At the Working Group’s first meeting, General Ham
announced his number one rule for serving on this Group: “Check your
personal views at the door.” He explained that our personal views did
not matter. We had a task to do to the best of our ability. The question
was not whether any individual approved or disapproved of
homosexuality in general or of gays and lesbians serving openly in the
military. We needed to put aside our personal beliefs to accomplish
76. As expressed by Jonathan Lee, who served as Special Assistant to the Co-Chair Jeh
Johnson, the Working Group “helped facilitate a DADT repeal process that met the President’s
and the Secretary of Defense’s vision of the right way to accomplish this change.” See Jonathan
Lee, The Comprehensive Review Working Group and Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal at the
Department of Defense, 60 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 282, 308 (2013).
77. See infra app. A.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. For the full directive and terms of reference, see infra app. A.
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objectively what the Working Group was asked to do. He then directed
anyone to leave who could not accomplish the task because of their
personal beliefs. No one left.81
I did not appreciate the degree to which General Ham set aside his
own personal views until the morning the Working Group’s Final Report
was released nine months later. General Ham, when presenting the
Report in a closed-session hearing before the House Armed Services
Committee, was asked his personal opinion about gays and lesbians
serving openly in the military. The Report had concluded that the risk of
repeal to overall military effectiveness would be low. General Ham
responded by explaining that “his personal, deeply held religious views
did not condone homosexuality.” General Ham’s co-chair Jeh Johnson
remarked afterwards that Ham’s statement was the first time he heard
Ham give his personal view.82
HA: From a vantage point of a person trained in dispute resolution, I
thought it was clever to carve out of the Working Group’s mandate any
consideration of the merits of a repeal and not for the obvious political
and perception reasons. As a consequence of the Working Group and CoChairs assessing only the impact of repeal, members could try to do their
work without being distracted by developing a view for or against repeal.
This more limited role pulled members toward a more neutral
perspective, that was reinforced by the second task—to develop an
implementation plan regardless of their personal views on repeal.
Dividing the Working Group’s work product into two separate reports
also was an astute choice when considering how the reports would be
used by policymakers. Because the Co-Chairs presented a report that
assessed the repeal impact separately from a report on an
implementation plan, policymakers could weigh whether to vote for
repeal based on the assessment report with reassuring knowledge of a
feasible pathway for implementation if they chose to repeal.
Notwithstanding the admirable efforts to boost neutrality of the
Working Group through the formal directive and informal instructions,
the Working Group as an “intra-Department, inter-Service working
group” could not ultimately be viewed as neutral. It was composed of
interested parties, Service members and civilian DoD employees, all of
whom would be affected by the outcome of the process. 83 Rather than

81. Linell A. Letendre & Martin L. Cook, Right to Right: Personal Beliefs vs. Professional
Obligations, 48 U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. Q. 7, 12–14 (2018).
82. Id. at 13–14.
83. This point will be considered in-depth in the Part on information-gathering. See infra
Part VII.
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operating as neutral-facilitators, the Working Group functioned more
accurately as party-facilitators.
As interested parties, members could be perceived as reluctant to risk
their status within the group by asking difficult questions or challenging
superiors up the chain of command or as biased for or against particular
outcomes, as can commonly occur when using party-facilitators.
However, DoD personnel also offered the benefits of party-facilitators:
the members came with valuable knowledge, experience, and
relationships with many stakeholders that gave the Working Group the
necessary expertise, credibility, and head start on the short timetable.84
The Working Group informally facilitated a robust negotiation
process by engaging numerous stakeholders as will be considered in the
Part on Stakeholders,85 by gathering a massive amount of information to
inform the discussions as will be examined in the Part on InformationGathering,86 and by fashioning recommendations that considered
stakeholders’ interests as will be analyzed in the Part on Commitment.87
III. NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK
Before delving into the elaborate DADT repeal process as a
negotiation, this Article will set out well-recognized negotiation
benchmarks that it will apply. As noted in the introduction, this was not
a process where theory led practice. Instead, theory provides a basis for
assessing what was done.
In this overview of the negotiation process, we identify benchmarks
based on the popular interest-based model,88 which is used today by the
military.89 This model and its benchmarks can be packaged in multiple
84. See Lisa Hinz, Pros and Cons of Using Internal and External Facilitators, U. MINN.
EXTENSION, https://extension.umn.edu/public-engagement-strategies/pros-and-cons-using-internal
-and-external-facilitators#sources-611660 [https://perma.cc/3YJH-YUWQ] (last visited Aug. 5,
2021); Sylvie Lessard, et al., External Facilitators and Interprofessional Facilitation Teams: A
Qualitative Study of Their Roles in Supporting Practice Change, IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 3 (July
16, 2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4947272/ [https://perma.cc/ BNY45T28] (studying the use of external and internal facilitators in health care).
85. See infra Part V.
86. See infra Part VI.
87. See infra Part VII.
88. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
42–57 (3d ed. rev. 2011).
89. This interest-based negotiation framework is used within the military. See U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF., DOD INSTRUCTION 5145.05, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) AND CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT (May 27, 2016), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/
dodi/514505p.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PHP-ST6U]; U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 511201, NEGOTIATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.af.mil/
Portals/1/documents/eeo/1/afi51-1201.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8FH-CWZC]. The model is also
used to teach cadets at USAFA and West Point with a variation used by Air Force Negotiation
Center.
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ways. We will use a circle metaphor that will be introduced in this Part
and further elaborated upon in Appendix B on the Negotiation
Framework as well as in the relevant Sections of the Article when applied
to the DADT repeal process.90 We will consider what the Working Group
did before going into the circle to negotiate, what happened inside the
circle, and how the Working Group exited the circle.91
This circle metaphor as a negotiation map incorporates seven key
elements, or for our purposes, benchmarks. Before entering the circle to
negotiate, parties build relationships among themselves (Relationships)
and gather the information they will need for the negotiations
(Communications). When inside the circle, parties identify the interests
of the different stakeholders (Interests), develop numerous options for a
possible resolution (Option-generation), and then claim what they need
for resolution by citing objective standards, trading options, or
negotiating positionally (Claiming). If the negotiation is successful,
parties exit the circle to solidify their resolution (Commitment). If the
negotiation fails to succeed, parties exit the circle to implement their
alternatives to settlement, known as their Best Alternatives to a
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).92 Most of the elements in this
negotiation map will be cited throughout this Article as benchmarks.
We also will consider how the Working Group used two “plus”
techniques that can be especially helpful in multiparty negotiations: (a)
the I-C-N Framework for classifying the roles of parties into one of three
groups: parties that need to be informed about what is happening, parties
that need to be consulted as the negotiation proceeds, and parties that are
directly involved in the negotiations; and (b) the Single Text Procedure
for eliciting feedback on drafts before a final proposed resolution is
presented.93
IV. STAKEHOLDERS
A. Identifying and Grouping Stakeholders by Positions (Not Interests)
When gathering information while still outside the circle, major
stakeholders in any dispute should be identified. That is exactly what
90. See infra app. B.
91. Bruce Patton, Building Relationships and the Bottom Line: The Circle of Value
Approach to Negotiation, NEGOT., Apr. 1, 2004, at 4–7; Bruce Patton, Negotiation, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 279 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005)
(summarizing the Circle of Value and Seven Element Problem-solving negotiation model).
92. A negotiator’s BATNA is simply a negotiator’s best alternative to an emerging
negotiated resolution, as further explained in Appendix B. In the DADT negotiations, the best
alternative to a negotiated resolution was seeking a judicial resolution.
93. See infra app. B on Negotiation Framework for brief explanation of these two
techniques.
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Secretary of Defense Gates sought when setting up the Working Group.
He directed it to engage a broad and diverse list of stakeholders.94
In his directive, Secretary Gates stated that it was “essential that the
working group systematically engage the force.”95 In the attached terms
of reference, he instructed the Working Group to “[e]nsure participation”
within the military community by involving “military service leadership;
appropriate OSD staff elements; cross service officer and enlisted
communities; mid-grade and senior ranks; human resources/personnel
specialists; pay and benefits specialists; family support programs
specialists; accession point and training communities; service academies
and/or senior service schools; and medical, legal and religious support
personnel.”96 He also directed the Working Group to reach outside the
military to other stakeholders “[i]n an appropriately balanced manner”
and to “engage Members of Congress, key influencers of potential service
members and other stakeholder groups that expressed a view on the
current and prospective policy.”97
The Working Group had to translate this mandate into a list of specific
people and organizations. The mandate went beyond the obvious
stakeholders that were directly involved in changing the law, the
Members of Congress. Even in a conventional two-party conflict, there
can be other parties who may have a stake in the outcome like a spouse
or business partner. And in this negotiation, there were many other
stakeholders who were affected, including people who may have been
necessary for implementing any resolution or were capable of derailing
it. In a multiparty negotiation, identifying all the parties with a stake in
the outcome can be challenging for the obvious reasons: a large number
of possible stakeholders can be impacted and the degree of impact on
each one is not always evident.98
The Working Group in its final report identified a long list of
interested organizations and people that it engaged in meetings including
those who were “prominent advocates for and against the repeal.” The
Working Group met with fifteen different advocacy groups plus samesex partners of current gay and lesbian Service members.99 It also
consulted with the four heads of the Services’ chaplains corps and their
endorsing organizations, met with the Service Surgeons General and key
medical associations and solicited input from twenty veteran and military
service organizations and met with several members of Congress and
94. See infra app. A.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See infra app. A for the Directive and Terms of Reference.
98. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Conflict Resolution by the Numbers, 33 NEGOT. J. 317,
318 (2017).
99. See infra app. A.
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their staffs.100 The Working Group surveyed 400,000 Service members
and 150,000 heterosexual spouses—one of the largest DoD surveys
conducted at that time.101
As in all negotiations, identifying the stakeholders is only a starting
point. Stakeholders’ positions and interests also need to be understood in
order to learn what motivates each of them. Grouping positions and
interests also can suggest likely alliances and coalitions that might
develop, an inherent and complicating dynamic in any multiparty
process.102
For the purposes of this study, stakeholders can be divided into three
primary groups: those who were against repeal or at least resisted it (resist
repeal), those who favored immediate repeal (for repeal), and those who
preferred gradual repeal (gradualists). The gradualists may have preferred
this approach because, in the case of an immediate repeal, there was a
concern that it would cause chaos and undermine military effectiveness.
There was a fourth group that is worth noting even though we will not
give much attention to them in this Article: the undecided. This group
included Members of Congress, Service members, and even some
Chaplains. Many in this fourth group seemed to be influenced by, if not
deferential to, the ultimate position of the Pentagon and its leaders.
The stakeholders within each group were bound by a common
position on DADT: resist repeal, support repeal, or gradual repeal. Of
course, a common position is not the same as a common interest. A
position is the result a stakeholder wants; an interest reflects the reason
for the position as was discussed in the Part on the Negotiation
Framework.103 A common position of stakeholders within a group can be
motivated by different interests. For example, many Chaplains and some
military leaders may have shared a common position to resist repeal, but
Chaplains and military leaders may have been motivated by different
interests. The opposition of some Chaplains may have been based on
religious principles while the opposition of some military leaders was due
to the timing of repeal while fighting two wars. These different interests
may have brought together the stakeholders to support a common
position.
B. Stakeholders’ Roles and Concerns
The role of each stakeholder within each group can be classified based
on its degree of involvement in the negotiations, as introduced in the
100. Id. at 40–42 (full list stakeholders and process for engaging them).
101. Id. at 1–2 (See Part 7 on information-gathering for more details of how the surveys were
conducted.).
102. See LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 209–13, 239
(Pearson Education, 7th ed. 2019) (explaining how coalitions operate in multi-party processes).
103. See infra Part III.
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Section on Negotiation Framework when discussing the I-C-N decision
making tool.104 Under the I-C-N tool, three possible roles can be
identified: Does the stakeholder decide (directly involved in the
negotiations)? Should the stakeholder be consulted? Or should the
stakeholder just be informed? These three descriptions can help clarify
how to involve each stakeholder in a multiparty process.105
The parties who decided were easy to identify because the negotiation
involved the repeal of a law. The only deciders were the two houses in
Congress and the President who announced at the outset that he supported
repeal. Among these deciders, there was a lot of direct negotiating.
The other two categories cover stakeholders that lacked decisionmaking authority although they had different degrees of influence over
the deciders. Stakeholders that needed to be consulted, like senior
military leaders, had subject matter expertise, were influential and were
affected by any repeal. Their support or acquiescence were essential for
repeal to be successful. Stakeholders that needed to be informed, like
most Service members, also were influential and were affected by any
decision. Their support or acquiescence also was necessary, although
they lacked subject matter expertise and their status did not warrant
greater involvement in the negotiations.
If a stakeholder without decision-making authority feels involved and
believes their input has been understood and considered, they may be
more willing to support or acquiesce to a decision, even one with which
they disagree or that imposes negative consequences. Giving attention to
these non-decision-makers can help cultivate their buy-in to the ultimate
outcome and its implementation.
With this three-category framework in mind, we will classify the role
of key stakeholders, indicate their position in brackets, and identify the
primary concerns that induced their position.
Deciders
The President [Repeal]
President’s Obama’s position on DADT was clear: repeal it. As
emphasized during his election campaign, along with the 2008
Democratic party platform that included gay and lesbian rights as a major
component, repeal of DADT was a priority for President Obama as
highlighted in his first state of the union address.106
Congress [Resist, Repeal, Gradualists]
Members of Congress were split among those who favored repeal,
104. See infra Part III.
105. See supra Part III; JEFF WEISS, HBR GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING 112–16 (2016).
106. 2010 State of the Union, supra note 5.
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gradualists, and resisters. Those favoring repeal wanted to give gays and
lesbians the full opportunity to serve freely in the military and argued that
their service would enhance military effectiveness. Gradualists favored
action on the military’s timeline; they were concerned that judicial
rescission of DADT would not allow time for a smooth transition. And,
those resisting repeal argued that “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” 107 Some
made moral arguments and viewed repeal as a threat to religious liberty
and as marginalizing religious beliefs.108 Others contended that repeal
would undermine military effectiveness and increase the risk of harm to
service personnel in war zones during the transition or after the
transition.109 Even Senator John McCain, a powerful and persuasive
voice on military matters, opposed repeal throughout the 2008
presidential debates and voted against repeal. He described the vote to
repeal as a “very bad day” that would “prove deadly distracting.”110
Consulting Parties-Primary (close to being Deciders)
Secretary of Defense and Uniformed Service Leadership [Gradualists]
The Secretary of Defense and the Uniformed Service Leadership did
not have formal decision-making authority during the nine-month
process but did have de facto veto authority because key members of
Congress were unlikely to support repeal without support of the defense
department’s leadership. As evidence of the essential role (and influence)
of the defense department’s leadership, the repeal statute that was
ultimately adopted would not become effective until certified by the
President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that, among other matters, repeal implementation will be “consistent with
standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and
recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces.”111
The Service leaders were officially neutral as they were obligated to
be,112 although they were probably restrained skeptics. They kept their
See 156 CONG. REC. S10649 (2010).
See id.
See id.; 156 CONG. REC. S10669-10679 (2010).
See Garance Franke-Ruta, John McCain’s ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Last Stand,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/12/john-mccainsdont-ask-dont-tell-last-stand/68243/ [https://perma.cc/GKB7-X8YN].
111. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act, S. 4023, 111th Cong. (2010).
112. For example, when Lt. General Mixon wrote a letter to the editor of Stars and Stripes
in March 2010 outlining his position against repeal and advocating for Service members and
families to speak out in opposition, both the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff rebuked Mixon’s statements as “inappropriate” to say because of his military status. See
Kevin Baron, Pentagon rebukes general for opposing repeal of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ law, STARS
AND STRIPES (Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.stripes.com/news/pentagon-rebukes-general-foropposing-repeal-of-don-t-ask-don-t-tell-law-1.100302 [https://perma.cc/3F7B-CX4R]. Chairman
107.
108.
109.
110.
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personal views private. As the process progressed and repeal seemed
possible, they unsurprisingly became gradualists. They wanted to
produce their own plan of incremental change to maintain military
effectiveness. The Service Branches’ worst nightmare was an overnight
change in policy. They wanted to control any repeal so that they could
minimize chaos and confusion during any transition and deal directly
with any backlash from some Service members and supporting
organizations.
As might be expected, the five services chiefs also were not in
agreement on repeal at every step. Even at the Senate Armed Service
Committee hearing right after the Working Group’s Report was released,
“[t]he chiefs varied in their views, with, generally speaking, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the Commandant of the Coast Guard in favor of repeal, and the Chiefs of
Staff of the Army and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps not in favor of repeal at this time.”113 The Marine Corps
Commandant was most resistant; however, they all agreed that the
military could execute the implementation plan if DADT were
repealed.114
Other Consulting Parties
This is a sampling of key consulting stakeholders who had
considerable subject matter expertise and influence, who would monitor
any implementation, and whose support would ease implementation.
Center for Military Readiness (CMR) [Resist Repeal]
CMR was a powerful and conservative military lobbying group with
the core interest of maintaining military effectiveness.115 It was formed
to address issues at the intersection of social issues and military
defense.116 The CMR focused on the military’s ability to effectively
execute its operations.117 It opposed repeal because there were too many
unanswered questions about the implications of repeal, including the risk
of undermining military effectiveness.118
of Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, even thought Mixon should consider resigning over the
comments. Id.
113. Lee, supra note 76, at 306.
114. Id.
115. About CMR, CTR. FOR MIL. READINESS, https://www.cmrlink.org/about
[https://perma.cc/KN2T-WKNC] (last visited June 13, 2018).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Military Culture Coalition Memo: Would LGBT Law and Policies Benefit or Harm
Our Military?, CTR. FOR MIL. READINESS, https://www.cmrlink.org/data/Sites/85/CMR
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Chaplain Corps Members (and their Endorsing Agencies) [Primarily
Resist Repeal]
Chaplain Corps Members that conducted religious services for the
military had multiple interests. Many chaplains were concerned that their
free exercise of religion and speech would be curtailed, and any conflict
between their religious beliefs and military policy would impact
negatively on their career, including promotional opportunities.119 Some
were worried that contrary to their religious beliefs, they would have to
counsel, marry, or work with gay and lesbian Service members.120 A
minority of chaplains, primarily some Episcopalian and Lutheran
chaplains, supported repeal.121
Of the 200 Religious Endorsing Agencies, most opposed repeal
although would not withdraw endorsements if the law were repealed,
unless chaplains’ free exercise of religion or speech would be curtailed.
An endorsement by a qualified religious organization was essential for a
military chaplain to serve.122
OutServe and the Service Members Legal Defense Network (SLDN)
[Repeal]
OutServe and SLDN have since merged and have the common interest
of advocating for LGBT rights in the military.123 Obviously, OutServe
and SLDN wanted gay and lesbian servicemembers to have the same
rights as heterosexual servicemembers.
Palm Center [Repeal]
Palm Center conducts research on critical and controversial public
policy issues. It did studies that focused on the rights and opportunities
for LGBT persons in the military as part of its push for immediate
repeal.124

Documents/CRWG_QUESTIONS-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QZN-5DCC] (last visited June 13,
2018).
119. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 134–36.
120. Id.
121. See DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 135.
122. Id. at 135.
123. As of May 2019, OutServe and SLDN merged with the American Military Partner
Association to form the Modern Military Association of America (MMAA). See Who We Are,
MOD. MIL. ASS’N OF AM., https://modernmilitary.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/FGX8-S6WC] (last
visited Aug. 8, 2021).
124. About the Palm Center, PALM CTR., https://www.palmcenter.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/4FUU-HB49] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
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Parties to be Informed
Two large groups needed to be informed because they would be
affected by repeal and involved with implementation due to their status
but would not be directly involved in the negotiations: heterosexual
Service members and their families and gay and lesbian Service members
and their families.
Service Members in Support of Repeal
These Service members expressed interests in promoting freedom of
service, recognizing the changing times, and reducing burdens on gay and
lesbian Service members.125 Many Service members saw the integration
of gays and lesbians into the military as the next logical step after
integration based on race and gender.126 Those in support of repeal
viewed any resistance as largely generational as younger Service
members were “more accepting of open homosexuality.”127 They thought
that repeal would be an insignificant change because they believed they
had already served alongside gay and lesbian Service members and saw
repeal as a “non-event.”128 Their primary interests included insuring
everyone was capable and that the military had enough personnel to
accomplish its mission.129
Service Members Against Repeal
These Service members often expressed religious and moral
objections.130 They were also concerned about sharing living facilities
with gay and lesbian Service members, socializing within units, new
training for a repeal during wartime, flamboyancy in the face of
standards, spread of STDs such as HIV, money and resources expended
on benefits for gay and lesbian Service members, using the military as a
social experiment, and diminishing family values.131
Heterosexual Spouses of Service Members
Heterosexual spouses of Service members were largely okay with
repeal according to the Working Group’s Survey where 78% of families
said “repeal would have no effect on or would improve their family
readiness” while 8% said it would reduce family readiness.132
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 56–61.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 51.
DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 50–56.
Id. at 114.
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Gay and Lesbian Service Members
Input from these Service members and their families was difficult to
gather. The Working Group wanted to ensure that it heard from them and
their spouses and partners, but the Working Group could not learn their
names because the DADT statute required that they be discharged.133 So,
the Working Group designed a third-party process with confidentiality
safeguards to gain their input.134 Their interests included removing the
heavy burden of DADT, which promoted lying about their lives, and
increasing their personal effectiveness and unit cohesion by promoting
honesty with fellow unit members.135 They also wanted to stop hiding
their families and involve them in their work lives.136
C. Transition to Next Sections
As appropriate for any multiparty process, the Working Group
identified and engaged a diverse range of stakeholders, learned their
concerns, and involved them at appropriate junctures. The stakeholders
actively participated in the deliberative process as will be examined under
the Information-Gathering Part.137 In the final Part on Commitment, we
will highlight how the Working Group’s Recommendations addressed
many of the stakeholders’ interests.138 In the next Part, we will consider
why many of the stakeholders, whether resisting appeal, pushing for
repeal, or advocating for a gradualist approach, stayed involved in the
negotiations due to their unattractive alternative to a negotiated
agreement (their BATNA).139
LAL: As should be apparent by this description of the various
stakeholders, DoD was pulled in multiple directions by the legislative and
executive branches, a large number of diverse advocacy groups, and, as
highlighted in the next Part, the judiciary. Right in the middle of this
morass of heated conflicting views was DoD and its Working Group
trying to conduct studies and surveys, review an array of policy decisions,
and prepare recommendations to help inform this controversial debate.
To make matters more complicated, we needed to remain vigilant to not
only engage the full range of advocacy groups, but also to do so in an
equitable manner regarding time spent and topics discussed. One key
member of the Working Group had a full-time job to handle all
engagements and to ensure parity of access among interested groups.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 60–61.
Id.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
See infra Part V.
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(Yes, this is my undisguised attempt to make readers feel at least a little
bit sorry for DoD!)
V. WHY NEGOTIATE? THE BATNA
Why would these stakeholders prefer to negotiate at the proverbial
negotiation table rather than exit the circle? The answer lies in what
would have happened if they left. Parties leave when they think they can
gain a more favorable outcome elsewhere. In negotiation nomenclature,
the leaving option is known as the Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement (BATNA)140
For some stakeholders, the preferred alternative to a negotiation can
be the status quo. If they do nothing or find a way to derail the
negotiations, then the status quo would be maintained, which in this case
would be retaining the 1993 DADT law. This was a preferred alternative
for any stakeholder that opposed repeal until the 2003 U.S. Supreme
Court Lawrence v. Texas141 decision when doing nothing no longer
necessarily meant nothing would happen. The changed legal landscape
precipitated by the Lawrence decision posed a palpable risk of a judicially
imposed modification or invalidation of DADT.
Legal challenges to DADT began before the Lawrence decision; they
began soon after the federal statute and DoD implementing regulations
were adopted in late 1993.142 Within only a few months, in early March,
the ACLU and Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund filed a federal
suit on behalf of six gay and lesbian Service members arguing that DADT
was invalid under the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.143
Other suits soon followed.
In a series of early appellate court decisions, the courts ruled entirely
in DoD’s favor because the courts gave military views great deference
and because the law was tested against a minimum standard of scrutiny
under the equal protection and free speech clauses. Any rational basis for
DADT was sufficient for upholding the statute.144 These decisions
140. FISHER ET AL., supra note 88, at 102. See also infra app. B.
141. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (held a Texas sodomy statute as
unconstitutional under the due process clause).
142. For a discussion of legal cases from the adoption of DADT to repeal, see JODY FEDER,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40795, ‘DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2013).
143. See Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038, 1039 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting a
preliminary injunction but not reaching the full merits of the claims) rev’d, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir.
1996); ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Is Challenged in Suit, supra note 62; see also Thomasson v. Perry,
80 F.3d 915, 919 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of DADT).
144. Challenges to DADT were consistently rejected in various circuits when the
Government only had to show a rational basis for the policy. See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d
628, 632 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997);
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996); Able, 88 F.3d at 1296; Thomasson, 80 F.3d
928–29 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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offered an attractive BATNA for stakeholders who opposed repeal and
the gradualists that feared an overnight change in policy. Judicial
outcomes provided more certainty than negotiating a resolution.
The legal landscape for DADT was transformed by the Lawrence
decision when it reversed the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.145 For the
first time, the Supreme Court gave heightened scrutiny to a statute that
impacted homosexuals.146 Even though the Court did not articulate the
level of scrutiny other than requiring a “careful analysis,”147 the decision
opened the judicial door to probing laws more deeply rather than merely
looking for a rational basis to uphold them.
Litigants were eager to find out whether DADT would survive under
Lawrence’s heighted level of scrutiny. This new era of rapidly unfolding
litigation changed the BATNA for stakeholders in the period leading up
to President Obama’s effort to repeal DADT and the formation of the
Working Group. Three cases quickly became the testing grounds for
crafting a new BATNA for the stakeholders.
In the first decision by a circuit court to apply the new Lawrence
standard, Witt restored a substantive due process claim after rejecting the
limited rational basis review by the lower court.148 The government
needed to advance an important governmental interest under a multifactor test.149 The court applied a heightened level of scrutiny to DADT
and found that the government advanced an important governmental
interest involving the management of the military.150 However, it was
unclear whether DADT, when applied to the plaintiff reservist, Major
Witt, satisfied the other required factors for upholding the law.151 When
applied to Major Witt, did the law further significantly the government’s
interest? Was there a less intrusive means that would serve that interest?
In this first heightened scrutiny case, the court remanded it to the trial
court to consider whether the Government’s defense of DADT satisfied
these other two factors.152 This as-applied test also opened the door to the
possibility of different results for different gay or lesbian Service
members.
Less than three weeks later, a decision by another Circuit Court
dismissed a challenge to DADT based on its interpretation of Lawrence.
In Cook v. Gates,153 the court noted that courts and commentators
interpreting Lawrence have diverged over the doctrinal approach for
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 578.
Id.
Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 821.
Id.
528 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2008).
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invalidating the sodomy statute. Some had read Lawrence to apply a
rational basis approach.154 Others viewed the test as one based on strict
scrutiny.155 A third group thought the case balanced state and individual
interests in a way that was neither a strict scrutiny nor rational basis test.
The court concluded that there was no consensus on how to read
Lawrence’s doctrinal approach.156 The court in Cook was persuaded that
“Lawrence did indeed recognize a protected liberty interest for adults to
engage in private, consensual sexual intimacy, and applied a balancing of
constitutional interests that defies either the strict scrutiny or rational
basis label.”157 The court applied a middle-ground standard of review.
In Cook, the court concluded that the Supreme Court gave Congress
“the highest deference” in ordering military affairs because the courts
lack institutional competence, and the Constitution gives the power to
raise and support armies to Congress.158 The court reasoned that
“[a]lthough the wisdom behind the statute at issue here may be
questioned by some, in light of the special deference we grant
Congressional decision-making in this area [military affairs] we conclude
that the challenges must be dismissed.”159
Then, six weeks before the Working Group released its Report and
Recommendations, a district court in the Ninth Circuit held DADT
invalid. The court applied the Witt standard after conducting a full trial
with witnesses, expert statements, and reports. In Log Cabin
Republicans,160 the court concluded that the evidence showed that the
Act’s effect had not been to advance the government’s interests of
military readiness and unit cohesion, but instead to harm those

154. See Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 2006); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d
808, 818 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004);
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817–18 (11th Cir. 2004);
Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1143 (W.D. Wash. 2006); United States
v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md.
219, 310 (Md. 2007); State v. Lowe, 861 N.E. 2d 512, 517 (Ohio 2007); Ex parte Morales, 212
S.W.3d 483, 493 (Tex. App. 2006); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 29 (Kan. 2005); Martin v. Ziherl,
607 S.E.2d 367, 370 (Va. 2005); State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872, 878 (Wash. App. 2005).
155. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1252 (Barkett, J., dissenting); See Fields v. Palmdale Sch.
Dist., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that Lawrence established a
fundamental right); Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 871 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev’d, 405 F.3d
700 (8th Cir. 2005); Hudson Valley Black Press v. IRS, 307 F. Supp. 2d 543, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(same); see also Donald H.J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf Off the Right of Privacy: Sex and the
Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 969 (2005); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
Fundamental Right that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1917 (2004).
156. Cook v. Gates, 528 F. 3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 57.
159. Id. at 63.
160. 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
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interests.161 The court ruled that plaintiffs’ evidence amply illustrated that
the Act did not have a “plainly legitimate sweep” and that defendants
failed to satisfy the burden of proving that the Act significantly furthered
the government’s interests.162 The court also noted that it was not bound
to follow authority from another Circuit.163 In any event, it found the logic
of Cook unpersuasive.164 The court, when finding that the defendants
failed to satisfy their burden under the Witt standard, issued a nation-wide
injunction barring the enforcement of DADT.165
The court decision invalidating DADT with no implementation plan
was issued while the Working Group was occupied preparing its
recommendations and plan. The decision generated considerable
confusion. Could DoD discharge gay members? Could DoD recruit
openly gay members? In a period of a few weeks, the answers changed
multiple times as the injunction went into place and then was lifted by
appellate courts.166 This “on-again-off-again” switch reminded senior
military leaders how unstable and unpredictable personnel policy would
be if left to the courts.167
These three cases that applied the more exacting Lawrence review
made it clear that DADT was now vulnerable to legal attacks. This
momentous change in the BATNA calculus kept many key stakeholders
at the proverbial negotiation table while litigants pressed forward with
the Supreme Court as the likely final stop unless there was a negotiated
resolution.
These changes in the BATNA were appealing to parties that favored
repeal. Courts would no longer reliably uphold DADT. And, if repealers
were successful in court, DADT would be held invalid, and gays and
lesbians would be able serve openly in the military. This less predictable
BATNA posed uncertainty for repeal opponents.
This post-Lawrence BATNA created terrifying uncertainty for
Id. at 919.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 925–26.
Id. at 962.
Id.
See DEPT. OF DEFENSE, MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS: HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT DISCHARGE PROCESSING (2010), https://politico.com/pdf/
PPM152_memo_from_undersecretary_stanley.pdf [https://perma.cc/78YF-3QV7] (illustrating
the challenges of operating in this legally uncertain environment).
167. See id. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness tried to give
guidance as the litigation was unfolding. He first explained that because a court enjoined
enforcement of DADT, DoD will discontinue proceedings for dismissal while noting that the
injunction might be stayed soon and the uncertainty about the future of DADT. Id. Six days later,
he issued a second memorandum after the stay was granted and DADT was back in force. Id. He
indicated that given this “twist” and “legally uncertain period,” the Secretary Defense directs that
no servicemembers will be separated from service under DADT without personal approval by
designated DoD officials. Id.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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military leadership and other gradualists who wanted stability and
uniformity. Senior military leaders, regardless of individual opinions on
DADT, found court decision disconcerting when they could no longer
rely on foreseeable judicial outcomes. They feared that a judicial decision
invalidating DADT or one that allowed “as-applied” challenges could
result in the military leaders losing control of any roll-out. They feared
chaos. Lower court decisions were already creating a web of differences
on standards of conduct and training requirements across the force.
Antithetical to leadership doctrines, courts would not provide what senior
military leaders needed most to ensure military effectiveness—control,
uniformity, and certainty.
With the circuits split, it was no longer clear which side would
prevail.168 It was in this precarious legal environment that the Working
Group and Co-Chairs reached out to stakeholders and prepared its
recommendations and plan. And this unpredictable BATNA motivated
many stakeholders to engage in the multiparty process facilitated by the
Working Group.
LAL: It was clear to me why the senior military Service leaders stayed
engaged, and it was not just because the Secretary of Defense said to stay
engaged! They knew they had a bad BATNA. Military leaders could not
control the disruptive court decisions. The Services stayed at the table
because the BATNA was worse than a negotiated resolution.
In United States v. Witt, for which I had been part of the government
legal team prior to joining the Working Group, the 9th Circuit employed
an “as-applied” standard. This legal approach meant that the military
could have a different answer with every litigant. The idea that DADT
may be constitutional in one circuit and unconstitutional in another
circuit was alarming to Military Leaders. The notion that we might have
an as-applied standard that would tell one soldier she could serve openly
and another soldier that he couldn’t would be highly disruptive and
contrary to the fundamental principles of uniformity that we treasure and
need in the military.
VI. INFORMATION-GATHERING
A. Research, Surveys, and Studies
Secretary Gates’s directive called for an “analysis of current data and
information” as well as to contract with the RAND Corporation to update
its report Sexual Orientation and the U.S. Military Personnel Policy:
Options and Assessment.169 Pursuant to this Directive, the Working
168. Lee, supra note 76, at 305.
169. For the full letter and terms of reference, see infra app. A.
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Group completed and commissioned a massive number of surveys and
studies to assist stakeholders in assessing repeal.170 During the ninemonth undertaking, dozens of modest and large-scale surveys and studies
were completed at a cost of over $9.1 million.171
The Secretary of Defense also directed the Working Group to engage
Service members in the information-gathering process:
To effectively accomplish this assessment, I believe it
essential that the working group systematically engage the
force. The participation of a range of age, rank and warfare
communities in this study including families, in addition to
active outreach across the force is a critical aspect that will
undoubtedly lead to insights and recommendations essential
to the Department’s implementation of any change.172
The directive induced the Working Group to solicit views and expert
input through a variety of means not only from Service members and their
families but also interest groups for and against DADT repeal, scholars,
and experts.
According to the Working Group’s Report:
[T]he Working Group received survey responses from
115,052 Service members and 44,266 military spouses.
Ninety-five information exchange forums were conducted
with over 24,000 service members, 140 smaller focus group
sessions with a total of about 14,000 service members, and
received 72,384 online inbox entries. Westat173 engaged in
interactive online confidential communications with 2,691
service members, including 296 who self-identified as gay
or lesbian. The Working Group also engaged in discussions
with a variety of different foreign governments, interested
groups, historians, academics, doctors, chaplains, lawyers,
veterans, communities within the military, and members of
Congress on this topic.174
These numerous surveys and studies are described and assessed in
Appendix C on Information-Gathering.175 Based on the Working Group’s
research and outreach, the Co-Chairs Johnson and Ham completed two
herculean tasks: (1) They assessed the impact of repeal on military
170. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 49.
171. This estimate is from Retired Air Force Lt. General Biscone who served as Chief of
Staff for the Working Group (received information in August 2020).
172. See infra app. A.
173. Westat is an independent research firm whose capabilities include data collection and
survey research. See WESTAT, https://www.westat.com [https://perma.cc/J255-VWM4] (last
visited Aug. 10, 2021).
174. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 49.
175. See infra app. C.
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effectiveness and (2) They recommended how best to manage the impact
of a repeal if it occurs (including recommendations to modify statutes and
DoD policies.)
One way to appraise this mammoth collection of information is to
assess which surveys and studies carried the persuasive power of an
“objective standard.”176 Information meeting this standard will be more
credible and easier to defend because, by definition, the information
would be from independent and trustworthy sources, including ones that
the parties cannot influence.177
For example, a statement of a member of the Australian military that
the integration of gays and lesbians did not impact the military’s
effectiveness would not be based on an objective standard. It would
simply be the opinion of this one member. However, an independent and
statistically valid study of the integration of gays and lesbians in the
Australian military would carry more weight as an objective standard.
This defensible study would offer insights into the possible impact of
DADT repeal on the U.S. military although the study of another military
would not be dispositive in the U.S. context. It could still sway the
discussion and be used to justify choices. Not all objective standards are
equally persuasive.178 For example, an independent academic who has
studied the integration of gays and lesbians in the Australian military can
offer her personal expert opinion and be convincingly defended but may
not be as persuasive as a statistically valid study.
Negotiators are fond of citing objective standards because of their
persuasive power.179 Objective standards can include independent
substantive studies such as the ones the Working Group sponsored, fair
processes, precedents, and common practices.180 Their use can reduce the
adversarial propensities of parties to press for results based on brute
will.181 Instead, parties advance positions based on defensible objective
criteria, that are not merely rationalizations for a desired result. Parties
176. Because of the connection between information-gathering (outside the circle) and
assessment of information (inside the circle), we treat together these two analytically separate
stages of negotiations.
177. FISHER ET AL., supra note 88, at 82–95.
178. Chuck Doran & Megan Winkeler, What Are Objective Standards?, MWI
https://www.mwi.org/what-are-objective-standards/ [https://perma.cc/UPX3-NJKV] (last visited
May 3, 2022) (discussing different forms of objective standards and how some forms are more
persuasive than others).
179. Setting Standards in Negotiations, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM ON NEGOT. (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/salary-negotiations/the-power-of-standards-how-not-to-negotiate
-your-salary/ [https://perma.cc/C6MW-4KJ4].
180. Amanda Penn, Objective Criteria: Keys to Successful Negotiation, SHORTFORM (Sept.
28, 2019), https://www.shortform.com/blog/objective-criteria-in-negotiation/ [https://perma.cc/
MLS6-8AF6] (describing ways to obtain objective standards).
181. FISHER ET AL., supra note 88, at 23.
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can jointly examine and assess legitimate and practical objective
standards.182 When they probe standards, they can engage in a rational
discussion that offers opportunities to persuade each other on the
merits.183 An empirical study, for example, offers parties a credible
source to discuss and interpret. Even though the study may not be
decisive because of conflicting views on the validity of its design or
inputs (data), the study can provide upper and lower boundaries for
reasoned discussion and compromise.184
Objective standards can be especially valuable in a multiparty
negotiation, like this one because standards can become the basis for
moving multiple parties from conflicting positions and counter-attacks to
a more measured discussion and a reasoned result.185
The Working Group’s surveys and studies are assessed in Appendix
C, including which ones did not qualify as objective and yet still had some
persuasive power.186 Both objective and non-objective informationgathering produced useful insights relevant to the repeal discussion and
an implementation plan.
The Working Group offered its own self-assessment of these two
categories of information-gathering, including recognizing the
limitations of the non-objective ones.187 As to the massive survey of
182. See James J. White, The Pros and Cons of Getting to YES, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC., 114, 116–
17 (1984); Roger Fisher, Comment on White’s Review, 34 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 121–22 (1984).
183. Fisher, supra note 182, at 122.
184. See White, supra note 182, at 117.
185. FISHER ET AL., supra note 88, at 83–84 (explaining the benefits of objective standards
in multi-party negotiations).
186. See infra app. C.
187. The working group explained:
For this section of the report, there is an important caveat. If the Working Group
were to attempt to numerically divide the sentiments we heard expressed in IEFs,
online inbox entries, focus groups, and confidential online communications
between those who were for or against repeal of the current Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell policy, our sense is that the majority of views expressed were against repeal
of the current policy. However, any such effort to divide the sentiments into one
camp or another would not have any quantitative value, and would be highly
misleading and flawed. As we discovered from the survey results, the views
voiced both for and against repeal in IEFs, online inbox entries, focus groups,
and confidential communications were not representative of the force as a whole.
The Service members we heard from through these mechanisms were those
individuals who felt strongly enough and motivated enough to give voice to their
views. Further, the Service members and spouses participating in IEFs, focus
groups, the online inbox, and online confidential communication mechanism
were not selected through a formal sampling process to ensure representativeness
of the force. Many volunteered to participate, while others were asked by their
local commands to participate. It is also true that Service members could make
multiple inputs to the online inbox and online confidential communication
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Service members and the survey of families, it concluded that, “[t]he
survey results . . . were intended to and did capture the views of the force
as a whole in an analytically sound and objective manner, and were
representative across every component of the force.”188
This information-gathering process by the Working Group that
extensively involved military stakeholders and their families did more
than inform the discussions; it also likely cultivated buy-in to whatever
the result might be, as will be discussed in Subsection C.189
B. Critique of Information-Gathering
The results of the Working Group’s surveys worried advocates for and
against repeal for the obvious reason—each side feared the outcome
might hurt their positions. One of the sharpest critiques was from a group
of gay veterans’ organizations that supported repeal.190 They condemned
the survey questions as a referendum on the wisdom of repeal and as
biased against gays and lesbians.191 They were concerned that the results
could be used to justify discriminatory measures in the name of unit
readiness.192 As Alexander Nicholson, executive director of
Servicemembers United and a former U.S. Army interrogator, expressed:
“It is simply impossible to imagine a survey with such derogatory and
insulting wording, assumptions and insinuations going out about any
other minority group in the military. Unfortunately, this expensive survey
stokes the fires of homophobia by its very design.”193
However, when a favorable report was published later in the year, the
same Alex Nicholson offered a more positive view, stating: “The
Pentagon Working Group did a very thorough job of trying to explore a
wide variety of concerns over the repeal of the U.S. military’s gay ban,
but I really think their results reflect an overabundance of caution.”194
Of course, advocates against repeal were equally critical of the
Working Group reports. In a memorandum prepared by the Military
Culture Coalition entitled, “Would LGBT Law and Policies Benefit or
mechanism.
See DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 49–50.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. See infra Section 7.C.
190. See David S. Cloud, Pentagon Survey on ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Criticized as Biased,
L.A. TIMES (July 9, 2010), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-jul-09-la-na-militarygays-20100710-story.html [https://perma.cc/S4F5-J2V6].
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. Ed Hornick, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’: The Reality of Repeal, CNN (Dec. 2, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/12/02/dadt.future.questions/index.html [https://perma.cc/
PCB5-QU86].
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Harm Our Military?” coalition members criticized the reports for the
outstanding issues that it “failed to anticipate or resolve” and for its
“unrealistic promises, and flawed assumptions and platitudes about
leadership.”195 They then posed a long list of questions for members of
Congress to ask in hearings with the exhortation that “[i]f Pentagon
officials cannot or will not provide specific answers, it is not fair to expect
commanders in the field to sort it all out.”196 They organized the questions
around ten issue headings and grouping of topics.197
While advocacy groups expressed a range of critiques about the
information-gathering approach, they overlooked the utility of the
surveys and focus groups for engaging stakeholders and cultivating buyin to whatever the result might be.
C. Overcoming Obstacles and Cultivating Buy-in
The surveys and focus groups that involved service members and their
families did more than spawn information and insights to inform the
discussions and ultimate recommendations. Engaging stakeholders in
information-gathering also likely helped them overcome value-based
obstacles and status quo bias while bolstering support for whatever the
outcome might be.
As highlighted in this Article’s introduction,198 value-based conflicts
are among the most difficult ones to resolve and were a central feature of
the DADT debate. The discussions implicated religious beliefs that
condemned homosexuals and viewed homosexuality as a sin, as well as
personal views hostile to working with homosexuals in close quarters and
in the battlefield.199
For overcoming value conflicts, MIT Professor and Practitioner
Professor Susskind suggests a few non-exclusive approaches.200
Professor Susskind suggests reframing a values-driven dispute based on
shared and universal overarching values.201 Broad values are baked into
military training that is designed to reach a large and diverse population
in uniform. While each service has a slightly different approach, key
tenets of honor, service before self, and duty are fostered to develop a

195. Military Culture Coalition Memo: Would LGBT Law and Policies Benefit or Harm Our
Military?, supra note 118 (memorandum that was distributed after the repeal was adopted by
Congress but before the required review and certifications were completed in order for repeal to
become effective).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See supra Part I.
199. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 134.
200. Susskind & Rose, supra note 10.
201. Id.
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common military ethos.202 Learning and living these shared core values
start on day one of military training, and entire organizations within each
service are dedicated to developing these values that are essential to the
profession of arms.203 These common values can sidestep other value
differences while opening lines of communication, opportunities for
building trust, and becoming a springboard for working together.
Professor Susskind also suggests engaging parties in relationshipbuilding dialogue.204 Rather than resolving a values-based dispute,
parties “move beyond demonization toward mutual understanding and
respect through dialogue.”205 They try to reach an accurate understanding
of each other’s point of view.206 This type of understanding does not
require sympathy or emotional connection, only possible ground rules
that may guide parties in their future interactions.207
In his third approach, Susskind calls for confronting directly value
differences.208 Parties explore and question each other’s values with the
goal of possibly altering them.209 Although parties typically resist
changing fundamental beliefs, he indicated that it can surprisingly
happen.210 Altering values might occur as a result of thoughtful
discussion that entails going deeper than usual, developing empathetic
understandings that go beyond stereotypes, and improving

202. The Army core values include loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity,
and personal courage. See The Army Values, U.S. ARMY, https://army.mil/values/
[https://perma.cc/5TTS-KZGY] (last visited Aug. 10, 2021); The Navy and Marine Corps share
the core values of honor, courage, and commitment. See About: Our Core Values, U.S. NAVY,
https://navy.mil/About/Our-Core-Values/ [https://perma.cc/D533-AT2R] (last visited Feb. 2,
2022); Marine Corps Values, MARINES, https://marines.com/life-as-a-marine/standards/
values.html [https://perma.cc/LM3R-52WV] (last visited Aug. 10, 2021). The Air Force’s core
values are “Integrity First,” “Service Before Self,” and “Excellence in all We Do.” See Vision,
U.S. AIR FORCE, https://airforce.com/mission/vision [https://perma.cc/MSA6-8A3T] (last visited
Aug. 10, 2021).
203. Core
Values:
Honor,
Courage,
Commitment,
RECRUIT
PARENTS,
https://rp.marineparents.com/bootcamp/core.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2021). The Air Force
promotes value development through PACE, the Profession of Arms Center of Excellence, which
promotes training and tools to develop values and leadership across the Service. Home, PACE,
https://airman.af.mil (last visited Aug. 10, 2021). One such product includes “The Little Blue
Book,” describing what it means to live the values expected as a member of the profession of
arms. U.S. AIR FORCE, AMERICA’S AIR FORCE: A PROFESSION OF ARMS (2022).
204. Id.
205. Katie Shonk, 3 Types of Conflict and How to Address Them, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM
ON NEGOT. (Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/conflict-resolution/types-conflict/
[https://perma.cc/CJ53-WMQG].
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Susskind & Rose, supra note 10.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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relationships.211 Even if parties do not compromise or change their
beliefs, they can learn to cooperate and live side by side with
fundamentally different values.212
These three approaches were in play in the way the questions in the
surveys and focus groups induced respondents to reflect on the common
military values highlighted above, the quality of relationships among
themselves, and personal values and differences.
Answering the questions also may have helped the respondents
overcome any status quo bias, a common obstacle in disputes. Parties can
be reluctant to change doing what they already feel safe and comfortable
doing. By maintaining the status quo, they can avoid the unknown and
unpredictable effects that change might precipitate, even for those that
may not fully embrace the status quo. Repealing DADT would reverse a
seventeen-year-old policy that replaced an even longer policy that banned
service by gays and lesbians.213 Repeal would open the door to many
uncharted and uncertain implementation issues. Any status quo bias due
to the unknowns was likely reduced by respondents considering the
probing DADT related questions.
Survey and Focus Group Questions
Consider how the survey questions may have facilitated change in the
face of value conflicts and status quo bias while cultivating buy-in when
repeal occurred.
Westat’s purposes for the surveys and research questions were clear
and limited:
2.1 Purpose of the surveys
The surveys were designed to measure perceptions of how
a repeal of DADT might affect military readiness, military
effectiveness, unit cohesion, morale, family readiness,
military community life, recruitment, and retention. The
surveys were not designed to be a referendum on the issue
of DADT repeal, nor can survey results alone answer the
question of whether repeal should or should not occur.214

Id.
Id.
See supra Part 2.
WESTAT, 1 SUPPORT TO THE DOD COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW WORKING GROUP
ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF REPEALING “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” 17 (2010). Research
questions—formal statements of what analysts want to discover from the survey results—were
developed for both the Service member and spouse surveys. The primary research questions for
the Service member survey included the following:
211.
212.
213.
214.
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The survey questions were formulated in accordance with standard
procedures for framing valid, neutral questions.215 The questions were
subjected to a rigorous process by Westat to prepare clear, unambiguous,
unbiased questions free of implicit assumptions, as explained in an
internal memo.216 The process included pretesting the survey in cognitive
interviews that were designed to enhance recollections by respondents.217
For the survey of uniformed members of the military, the 103
questions were reviewed by Working Group representatives, Westat, and
internal DoD social science experts.218 The questions were approved by
the co-chairs, and circulated for review by the military service chiefs,

 What is the likely impact of repeal on unit cohesion, morale, military
effectiveness, and readiness?
 What is the past experience with Service members believed to be gay or
lesbian?
 What demographic and service characteristics and military experiences affect
Service members’ views about the impact repeal might have?
 Overall, what are the main issues associated with repeal for Service members?
The primary research questions for the spouse survey included the following:
 What is the likely impact of repeal on recruitment, retention, family readiness,
and military community life, including use of military programs and services?
 How and from whom would spouses like to receive information or support
about a repeal of DADT, if that occurs?
 Does acquaintance with gay or lesbian individuals affect spouses’ views
regarding the potential impact of a DADT repeal?
Id.

215. This technique for forming questions can be contrasted with the controversial and
widely condemned push polling technique used in political campaigns and marketing. Push
polling is when polls that are presented as scientific ones but are designed to sway respondents.
See Marjorie Connelly, Push Polls, Defined, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/upshot/push-polls-defined.html [https://perma.cc/J65Q7J87].
216. See infra app. E.
217. Cognitive Interviewing techniques are designed to enhance retrieval of information
about an event through questions that are formulated to revive context of an event, ask about an
event from different perspectives, inquire about an event in several different orders, and probe
every major and minor detail about an event. See generally RONALD P. FISHER & R. EDWARD
GEISELMAN, MEMORY-ENHANCING TECHNIQUES FOR INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: THE
COGNITIVE INTERVIEW (1992); R. Edward Geiselman et al., Eyewitness Memory Enhancement in
the Police Interview: Cognitive Retrieval Mnemonics Versus Hypnosis, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 401
(June 1985); Mark R. Kebbell et al., The Cognitive Interview: A Survey of Its Forensic
Effectiveness, 5 PSYCH., CRIME, & LAW 101 (1999).
218. Lee, supra note 76, at 292.
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Secretary of Defense Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Adm. Mullen.219
Although the questions were carefully crafted to gather information
on perceptions, attitudes, and experiences, the questions likely did much
more. As recognized by Dr. Goodwin from the U.S. Army Research
Institute, who served on the Working Group and lead the survey design:
Even though the question drafters were determined to
formulate a survey with neutral questions that did not prime
any ideas that would orient the respondents on the repeal
issue, it was difficult to avoid entirely seeding ideas. For
example, if a question asks whether a respondent likes
pineapple on pizza, the question will plant an idea about an
ingredient on pizza that the respondent might have never
contemplated. Even though the question was designed to
learn about preferences, the question can unintentionally
accomplish more than gathering the intended information,
like triggering trying pizza with pineapple.220
The large-scale survey was designed to probe the respondents’
experiences in the military, including with gays and lesbian service
members.221 The questions were strategically divided into two parts
although the division was not disclosed to the respondents.
The first thirty-three questions out of 103 did not include any
questions that related to DADT or interacting with gay and lesbian
service members.222 Instead, they focused on developing baseline
information about the respondents’ experiences serving in the military.223
Respondents were asked to rate how well their units worked together, got
their jobs done, collaborated as teams, and socialized among
themselves.224 They were asked to rate unit morale, trust, leadership, and
much more.225 They were asked to reflect on their military experiences
without the answers being colored by questions related to their
experiences with gay and lesbian service members or with the DADT
policy,226 until they reached Question thirty-four.

219. Id.
220. Zoom Interview with Gerald F. Goodwin, PhD, Senior Research Scientist, U.S. Army
Rsch. Inst. for the Behav. and Soc. Scis. (Apr. 13, 2021) (In the interview, we discovered that
Goodwin disliked pineapple on pizza while Abramson liked it).
221. Lee, supra note 76, at 292.
222. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 160–79.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

196

[Vol. 32

Question thirty-four inquired whether respondents have served with a
male or female that they believed was homosexual.227 Then, according to
an internal memorandum, the questions in this second part probed those
experiences based on a strategic ordering by asking:
[P]otentially sensitive questions (such as questions about
sharing close sleeping quarters or shower stall areas) only
after . . . get[ting] the respondents’ answers to the questions
on the effects of a change in policy. This ordering should
minimize the chance that sensitive questions color or
influence responses to questions about the effect of a policy
change, if repealed.228
The questions covered a respondent’s military experiences with gay
and lesbian leaders, co-workers, and subordinates as well as social
interactions. Here are a few illustrative questions that were posed about
working with gay and lesbian leaders:
If they have had experience serving with a leader that they
thought was gay or lesbian, how would they now rate how
well the unit worked together? How would they rate the
unit’s morale when looking back in time? How would they
rate the unit’s performance? And among all the factors that
could affect how well a unit worked together, how much do
they belief that their leader who was gay or lesbian affected
the ability to work together?229
Similar questions were asked about working with gay and lesbian coworkers and subordinates, sharing missions in combat, and socializing
together.230 They were asked for example, “[w]hat would be the impact
of repeal on job satisfaction, willingness to continue to serve, recruitment
in the future, availability of technical capabilities, and much more?”231
For the small focus groups, the potential for the questions to do much
more than gather information becomes apparent when reading an internal
memo that described the script for conducting the sessions.232 The script
for the facilitators started with an introduction for respondents that
covered the following points: The Working Group had been directed by
the Secretary of Defense to conduct a review of issues associated with
repeal of DADT; the review was a response to the President calling on
Congress to repeal DADT; the Working Group would “examine the
issues that might arise if the law were repealed” and would “develop an
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 180.
See infra app. E.
See DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 181–82.
DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 193–94, 203.
DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 210–18 app. C.
See infra app. D.
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implementation plan” if there is a repeal; and the issues that the focus
groups will discuss include the impact of repeal on military readiness and
military effectiveness with attention on how to “best manage any impacts
during implementation.”233
These instructions primed respondents with what their Commanderin-Chief wanted done, the person at the top of the chain-in-command for
the people being surveyed, while highlighting well-recognized
overarching military values and orientating respondents to the possibility
of repeal when indicating that an implementation plan would be
developed in case there is a repeal.234
After this introduction, the questions to be posed were grouped into
three categories: learn about past experiences in the military with gays
and lesbians (gain context for respondent’s answers); explore issues
associated with repeal such as its impact on unit operations and service
recruitment (learn views on implications of a repeal); and consider issues
to be addressed in an implementation plan, the role of leadership and a
few concluding questions on “Who has had the greatest influence on your
views regarding Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” and “Who will have the greatest
influence in maintaining standards of conduct and the performance of our
units following repeal?”235
In closing remarks, facilitators were instructed to say:
We have discussed several areas that the military and
political leadership should consider when assessing the
implications of a repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, including
how integration will affect unit operations, the comfort level
of straight and gay service members and their families, as
well as actions military leadership might take to facilitate the
integration process.236
Analysis
As already suggested, the comments and questions posed in the focus
groups and surveys that engaged Service members and families did much
more than reveal perceptions, attitudes, and experiences. The comments
and questions induced self-awareness and reflection on overarching
military values, personal reactions, and relationships with superiors,
peers, and subordinates whether straight, gay, or lesbian, as respondents
confronted their own values. The inquiries also unavoidably conveyed a
sense that repeal would be likely, in our view, even though respondents
were told that the questions were designed to only investigate issues in
case of repeal. The questions oriented service members toward possible
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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change and contributed to overcoming any status quo bias by nurturing
an understanding of the contours and implications of the DADT policy
and preparing them for whatever the outcome might be. Resistant
respondents became acquainted with the possible policy change, which
presumably fostered their acquiescence even if they were opposed to
repeal.237
The surveys and focus groups also triggered informal conversations
among stakeholders outside of the formal information-gathering
process.238 These informal exchanges, along with the formal ones, gave
stakeholders an opportunity to express their thoughts and feel heard as
they contemplated the possibility of DADT repeal.
This information-gathering process that engaged numerous
stakeholders contributed to cultivating buy-in to the result. Any buy-in
might have been the ultimate accomplishment of this nine-month process,
even though it was not its explicit aim. By the time Congress voted to
repeal, stakeholders were acclimated to possible change.
D. Risk Assessment Panel
Following the surveys and focus groups, the Working Group
assembled a Risk Assessment Panel to assess the various risks associated
with DADT repeal.239 The panel leveraged not only the survey data but
also reams of analysis from other sources. 240
According to the Report, the Risk Assessment Panel was convened to:
[A]ssess impact of repeal on the areas specified in the Terms
of Reference. This panel was made up of subject matter
experts and Service members representing a range of
Service, rank, and warfare communities. The panel reviewed
all of the material relevant to each assessment area: military
readiness, unit effectiveness, unit cohesion, recruiting,
retention, and family readiness. Information and data for this
assessment was derived from the Working Group’s
systematic engagement of the force and their families, input
from interested and relevant organizations, scholarly work
of civilian and military researchers, experiences of foreign
militaries and domestic organizations with similarities to the
237. As with the consensus voting method in multiparty negotiations, to be contrasted with
majority or unanimous voting, some resisting stakeholders might have reached the point that they
could live with the outcome even if they did not endorse it. See Lawrence Susskind et al., An
Alternative to Robert’s Rules of Order in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 3 (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan &
Jenner Thomas-Larmer, eds., 1999).
238. Lee, supra note 76, at 309.
239. Id.
240. See infra app. C.
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military, and the historic record of racial and gender
integration in the U.S. military.
After coming to a numeric assessment of risk within each
area, the panel considered the various policy, legal, and
training and education recommendations that were intended
to mitigate impacts within each assessment area and then
developed a final assessment of risk.241
These assessments shaped the co-chairs’ ultimate conclusions on the
impact of repeal if adopted.242
Appendix C describes the role of the panel, its methodology, and its
risk assessments before and after any risk mitigation.243 In that Appendix,
we explain the steps the Working Group and panel followed to arrive at
its final risk assessment if DADT were repealed.244 They adopted what
they describe as “a standard military decision support process
recommended by the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
Directorate of the Joint Staff,” a process used by DoD in a variety of
complex military risk assessments and widely used in academia and
industry.245
The meticulous and intricate assessment process did not qualify as a
source of objective standards, however. Even though each panel member
applied a military effectiveness standard defined by the Working Group
and rendered their “professional judgment” as described in Appendix C
when assessing the impact of repeal, each member nonetheless was a
DoD employee (either military or civilian).246 Furthermore, the
assessment process was supervised by the Working Group, which
consisted entirely of DoD employees selected by the Secretary of
Defense.247 The panel members and Working Group members were
interested parties that could influence the outcome of the assessment that
would directly affect them.248
Nevertheless, the assessment results wielded considerable persuasive
power due to the way the assessments were derived. The assessors were
a diverse group of knowledgeable and experienced military members and
DoD career civilians who offered credible expertise even though laboring

241. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 46, 97–117.
242. Lee, supra note 76, at 300–01.
243. See infra app. C.
244. See DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 97–117 (explaining the methodology for assessing
the impacts of repeal without a mitigation plan and the impacts if the recommended mitigation
plan is adopted).
245. Id. at 98.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id.
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under a conflict of interest.249 The assessors considered massive input
from the surveys and studies that involved numerous Service members
and other stakeholders, and the team was well-versed in the array of
research conducted by the Working Group.250 They also followed an
elaborate multi-step assessment process that was monitored and checked
by a red team that observed the process from a separate room251 as
explained in Appendix C. Further, the process was transparent as
described in the detailed Working Group Report.252
While the panel’s assessments were not binding on the co-chairs, Jeh
Johnson and General Carter Ham, the assessments provided weighty
input for the co-chairs as they formulated their answer to the ultimate
question: What would be the impact of repeal on military effectiveness?
The answer and the Report recommendations were ones made
exclusively by the Co-Chairs.253
HA: Even though the members of the working group and panel were
instructed to leave their personal views outside the room, we all know
how difficult that can be to do. And surely in the world of selecting
neutrals, the conflict of interest would have been disqualifying. However,
as an offsetting factor, the military ethos to get the mission done might
have tempered personal inclinations.254
LAL: Because General Ham was particularly concerned about this
conflict issue, he demanded that a “red team” be added. The military
commonly uses red teams to challenge assumptions and sharpen
alternatives. The Red Team, although still DoD employees, watched the
assessment panel from a separate room as we conducted our
deliberations. We were in a proverbial “fishbowl.” The Red Team graded
us on our use of data and research, critiqued the assumptions we made,
and monitored for personal biases that might be influencing the
deliberations.
E. Partial One-Text Procedure
Before the Working Group completed its work and the Co-Chairs
finalized their recommendations, the Working Group was mandated to
249. Id.
250. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 98.
251. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 100; see also U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER,
THE RED TEAM HANDBOOK: THE ARMY’S GUIDE TO MAKING BETTER DECISIONS 3 (Version 9.0,
2018) (explaining the red team process).
252. See generally DADT REPORT, supra note 11.
253. Lee, supra note 76, at 300–01.
254. See, e.g., Letendre & Cook, supra note 81 (considering how the military oath of office
demands servicemembers to subordinate their personal beliefs to their professional obligations).
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employ what might be described as a partial one-text procedure255 for
enlisting feedback from military leadership. The Secretary’s Terms of
Reference instructed the Working Group that: “[p]rior to the delivery of
the report to the Secretary of Defense, each Service Chief shall be
afforded the opportunity to review and comment.”256 The Working Group
did this and much more as described in its final Report. The Services
input was built into the drafting process from the beginning.
First, while the Information-Gathering process was on-going, a full
range of policy choices needed to be considered should repeal occur. The
choices covered a range of issues such as what benefits can be available
for same-sex partners given that DOMA (Defense of Marriage Act) that
defined marriage as being between one man and one woman had not yet
been overturned and how to deploy gay and lesbian service members to
countries hostile to homosexuality.
The Services coordinated input through a multitude of policy memos
in advance of the draft report. In so doing, they had early input into
shaping what implementation might look like because they would
ultimately be involved with implementation.
Another key juncture for services input came when the Working
Group leveraged Service War Colleges and Non-Commissioned Officer
Academies to help review and influence the implementation plan.
Members of the Working Group visited these schools after policy
recommendations have been developed. Feedback panels were conducted
at the National Defense University, Army War College, Naval War
College, Air War College, and U.S. Marine Corps War College, as well
as U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Air Force Senior
Noncommissioned Officer Academy, and U.S. Navy Senior Enlisted
Academy.
After the Risk Assessments by the Panel were completed but before
the Co-Chairs’ final assessment was concluded, Services were invited to
“red team” the entire Working Group effort. This effort was separate from
the red team run by the Working Group for the Risk Assessment panel.
Each Service brought in a team that was given access to all the survey
data and information gathered by the Working Group. The Services red
teams also reviewed the research used by the Risk Assessment Panel and
its conclusions. These red teams reported back to their Service Chiefs in
advance of any feedback by the Service Chiefs.
Finally, the Working Group provided “the Military Department
Secretaries and Service Chiefs with a near-final version of the report for
review and comment. The Secretaries and Chiefs provided extensive
comments, as well as their perspectives on Service-level impacts, which
255. A process where a single draft is circulated for comments and then redrafted by
facilitator. For further understanding, see supra Part IV.
256. See infra app. A.
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helped inform recommendations and contoured the final version of the
report.”257
This process was not a full one-text procedure with iterative feedback
after each new draft that ended with a “yes” or “no” vote by the
stakeholders. It was a partial one-text procedure that resulted in the final
report and plan addressing key stakeholders’ interests as a one-text
procedure is designed to do, as will be examined in the final Part of this
Article.258
F. Information-Gathering Conclusion
As the Section on focus groups, surveys, studies, and panel
assessments evinced, the Working Group generated a mountainous
amount of information to inform the discussions and negotiations.259 The
information was derived from objective and subjective studies, and
professional judgments of the military assessment panelists.260 This
accumulation of information also informed the final report and the
recommendations of the Co-Chairs Jeb Johnson and General Carter Ham.
This Part also illustrated another valuable benefit of this informationgathering process.261 It fostered self-reflection among stakeholders, likely
acquiescence, and possible buy-in to whatever the result might be. As
explained by Professor Susskind when discussing values-based conflicts:
Negotiators caught up in values-based disputes need not aim
for settlement in the traditional sense. Increasing our respect
for views contrary to our own and learning to live with
fundamental differences in values and beliefs are themselves
laudable goals. When we engage in values-based dialogue,
we may not resolve our disagreements, yet we can strive to
learn more about one another so that we can more easily live
side by side.262
VII. RESOLUTION (COMMITMENT) MET INTERESTS
Reaching the Commitment stage is the goal of any negotiation if
parties want a resolution. It is the stage when parties exit the negotiation
circle toward resolution. Of course, with the DADT review, an alternative
exit would have been going to the courts. We have already examined why
that choice did not appeal to many stakeholders.263
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 47.
See supra Part VII.
See supra Part VIII.
See id.
See id.
Susskind & Rose, supra note 10.
See supra Part V.
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Two resolutions were reached, first by the Co-Chairs as reflected in
the final Report and Implementation Plan, and second, among Members
of Congress when they passed the repeal legislation. In this Part, we
clarify the Commitment by the Co-Chairs, give special attention to how
the report’s recommendations and plan met the interests of key
stakeholders and explain what Congress did including imposing an
unusual contingency before repeal could become effective.
A. Commitment by Co-Chairs of Working Group
In the memorandum establishing the Working Group, the Secretary of
Defense called for a report that would address the impact of repeal and a
plan for implementation if there is a repeal.264 The Working Group
generated multiple studies and risk assessments that the Co-Chairs
considered when producing the final report. The Working Group
consisted of sixty-eight members, including more than twenty staff
members plus teams based on function (policy; legislative, regulatory,
and legal; education and training; and surveys).265 Also, among members
of the Working Group, a Panel of twelve to fifteen members were
selected to assess risks to military effectiveness if there were a repeal. But
none of the Working Group’s work products were the result of a
consensus or voting process, nor adopted by DoD.266
Only the impact assessments and the final recommendations reflected
an agreement, and it was an agreement that resulted from negotiations
between the Co-Chairs Jeh Johnson and General Ham. They are the only
ones that signed their names to the Report. Any references to “we” in the
Report were references to the Co-Chairs because ultimately it was their
assessment and recommendations.
LAL: I have reflected on why the Co-Chairs came to an agreement
and were comfortable exiting the negotiation circle. I spent nearly every
day with the co-chairs for nine months; General Ham in particular was
very circumspect about his views. I believe General Ham became
comfortable leaving the circle based on his hearing Service members’
views—both from his extensive travels during the review and the large
surveys. I also believe the Risk Assessment Panel findings made him
comfortable that repeal could be implemented, even during a time of
conflict.
The ultimate test of any commitment is whether it meets the interests
of key stakeholders. Resolution alone is not the test of success. When
264. See infra app. A.
265. See Lee, supra note 76, at 300–01.
266. See id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

204

[Vol. 32

reading the Report’s recommendations and plan through an interest lens,
we can see how they addressed, to varying degrees, many interests of
stakeholders including the interests of those who were resisting repeal
and those endorsing a gradualist approach.
B. Interests that Needed to be Met
Maintaining military effectiveness in event of repeal. This interest was
the primary one for gradualists and some resistors, like military leaders,
Service members, Members of Congress, and CMR although it would be
fair to suggest that all stakeholders had this interest.267
Minimizing chaos and confusion during any repeal. This interest was
likely the primary one for gradualists, like military leaders, Service
members, and some members of Congress.
Preserving moral and religious values, including freedom of religion
and speech. These interests were the primary ones for resistors, like the
Chaplains, some Service members, CMR, Alliance for Defense Fund, and
some Members of Congress although they were interests of others too.268
Overcoming practical and economic implementation obstacles. These
interests were the ones for resistors, like some Service members, CMR,
Alliance Defense Fund, and some Members of Congress. They were
concerned about heterosexual Service members sharing living facilities
with gay and lesbian ones, difficulties socializing within the unit, need
for new training on repeal during wartime, any “flamboyant” behavior in
the face of standards, spread of STDs such as HIV, expending money and
resources on benefits for gay and lesbian Service members, and using the
military as a social experiment. 269
Opening service for gay and lesbian Service members with rights
equal to other Service members. These interests were the ones for
advocates of immediate repeal, like the President, OutServe, Service
Members Legal Defense Network, Palm Center, and gay and lesbian
Service members.270

267.
268.
269.
270.

DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 65–66.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 50–56.
See id. at 60.
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C. How These Interests were Met in the Report and Plan271
Understanding these different interests was essential when the
Working Group and Co-Chairs formulated recommendations that would
likely be acceptable to different stakeholders. For example, even though
many religious leaders and some military leaders were bound by a
common position to resist repeal, their different reasons (interests) for the
common position likely called for different recommendations that the
Report meticulously offered. For the resisting chaplains, the Report
recommended to “direct the Services to reiterate the principle that
chaplains, in the context of their religious ministry, are not required to
take actions inconsistent with their religious beliefs, but must still care
for all Service members. Evaluation, promotion, and assignment of
chaplains must continue to be consistent with these long-standing Service
policies.”272 For the resisting military leaders, the implementation plan
was designed to show that it was feasible to implement repeal while
fighting two wars.273
The Report specifically addressed the interest in military effectiveness
in the event of repeal when the Report stated that “the risk of repeal of
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell to overall military effectiveness is low.” 274 The
Report acknowledged that repeal would “bring about some limited or
isolated disruption,” but that “the U.S. military can adjust and
271. For further illustrations of how the report addressed interests, one may want to read its
recommendations, which are organized around these topics: “Leadership, Training, and
Education;” “Standards of Conduct;” “Moral and Religious Concerns;” “Equal Opportunity”
within the Military; “Collection and Retention of Sexual Orientation Data;” modifications to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice; “Privacy and Cohabitation” Policies; “Benefits” for Same-Sex
Partners and Families; “Duty Assignments” (impacted by U.S. and foreign laws and policies and
international agreements); Medical issues (not insurance); “Re-Accession” (for Service members
discharged under DADT); “Release from Service Commitments” (for opponents if DADT
repealed-recommended against a policy of release); “Fiscal Impact” of Repeal; and “Follow-on
Review” of Repeal (after one year). Id. at 131–51.
The DADT repeal Implementation Plan also offers other illustrations of how the Working
Group tried to address stakeholders’ interests. For example, you might read through an interest
lens the “Frequently Ask Questions” (FAQs) and Vignettes (possible post-repeal scenarios). See
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUPPORT PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION, REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEW OF THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” app. D
[hereinafter DADT PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION]. When reading these 17 FAQs and 14 scenarios
through an interest lens, it becomes evident how the questions and scenarios were designed to
address interests of various stakeholders. For example, one FAQ asked, “how will repeal . . . affect
recruitment and retention policies?” Id. The answer affirmed that sexual orientation would not be
a factor. Id. Another one asked what benefits would be available for gay and lesbian members. Id.
The answer explained that benefits will be available to the Service members but that DOMA law
barred benefits for unmarried, same-sex partners.
272. See DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 136.
273. See DADT PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 271, at 1.
274. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.
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accommodate this change, just as it has others in history.”275 And the
implementation plan offered a reassuring pathway for maintaining
military effectiveness.276
For those with an interest in a gradual transition in order to maintain
stability and for those resisters who were concerned about practical and
economic implementation issues, the report included a detailed
implementation plan that set out three stages and considered how to
maintain standards of conduct, respect moral and religious concerns,
comply with equal opportunity policies, change the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), address privacy concerns, offer equal benefits,
and much more.277
For those interested in equal rights for gay and lesbian Service
members and their families, the recommendations and implementation
plan proposed how to do that primarily within existing laws.278
As already noted, the interest in preserving freedom of religion and
speech were met with recommendations within the limits of what was
feasible when adopting a policy contrary to the values of some
stakeholders. For this group of resisters, repeal was primarily a
distributive negotiation, which they lost.
The original 1993 DADT policy was a rare compromise of a value
issue that gave both sides something each side wanted. Value conflicts,
as already considered, can be the most difficult ones to resolve because
they can involve matters of principle, ideology, or religion that parties
want to uncompromisingly preserve.279 Under the DADT compromise,
gays and lesbians were formally excluded from military service (met an
interest of religious opponents) but gays and lesbians were permitted to
serve if no one knew their sexual orientation (met an interest of those
supporting open service). This compromise had the glaring practical
impact of limiting service to gays and lesbians who were willing to
assiduously hide their orientation while serving under DADT’s onerous
restrictions.
Even though religious stakeholders who wanted to exclude gays and
lesbians lost with repeal, the recommendations were designed to avoid
penalizing them for religious beliefs that would be contrary to the new
military policy. The Co-Chairs addressed religious interests with care and
in some detail in its recommendations280 after offering this reassuring
Id.
Id.
Id. at 131–51.
Id. at 134–36.
ABRAMSON, supra note 9, 160, 254–55.
See DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 134–36. See also DADT PLAN FOR
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 271, at app. D. A frequently asked question reaffirmed Service
members’ freedom of speech to express personal views and their freedom to practice religion
within limits of existing law. See id. One scenario considered how to handle an experienced
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
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introduction:
[I]t is critical that it be made clear to those who are opposed
to repeal, particularly on moral and religious grounds, that
their concerns are not being rejected and that leaders have
not turned their backs on them. In the event of repeal,
individual Service members are not expected to change their
personal religious or moral beliefs about homosexuality;
however, they are expected to treat all others with dignity
and respect, consistent with the core values that already exist
within each Service. For the U.S. military, these are not new
concepts, given the wide variety of views, races, and
religions that already exist within the force.281
LAL: The final edits to the report proofs were made by a small team
from the Working Group on November 26, 2010, the day after
Thanksgiving. For this holiday weekend adventure, I lugged my kids, then
8 and 4, to the basement of the Pentagon where we staged the final edits
prior to the report heading to the publishers. Before I turned on a Disney
movie for my children, I gave them a task: make sure the page numbers
of the report were in order from 1 to 256. Three minutes into this task,
my eldest came running to me, “Mom, someone scribbled his name on
the final report!” She found Jeh Johnson’s signature on page 17. Four
days later, we distributed the “scribbled” signature and 535 copies of the
report to Congress.
D. Commitment by Congress
Members of Congress ultimately had to vote for or against repeal.282
Members were split among resisters, repealers, and gradualists. During
the debate in the Senate, Members of all three views cited portions of the
Report to support his or her position.283 Not surprisingly, the Report was
cited amply by the repealers who had much support in the Report.284 But
the Report was also cited by resisters and gradualists who either criticized

recruiter who due to his personal religious beliefs says he cannot process an otherwise qualified
gay applicant. Id. Another scenario considered how to handle a complaint against a chaplain
whose sermon included statements that homosexuality is a sin. Id. The discussions of these and
other scenarios tried to address and reconcile any conflicting interests. See id. In the chaplain
scenario, for example, the discussion reaffirmed open service while respecting chaplains right to
express religious beliefs. See DADT PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 271, at app. D.
281. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 131.
282. See Lee, supra note 76, at 304–07 (describing the legislative process from release of
Working Group’s Reports until passage of repeal legislation and certification for becoming
effective).
283. Id.
284. Id.
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the Report or cited selective survey results that could be viewed as
supporting their positions.285
We all know how this story ends: the law was repealed.286 The final
vote, the Commitment by Congress, also reflected a continuing divide
with 65 Yeas and 31 Nays in the Senate, and 250 Yeas and 175 Nays in
the House, with voting mostly along party lines.287 The number of Yeas
did not reach the two-thirds that would have been necessary to override a
presidential veto if there were one, possibly under a different president.288
The repeal statute included an unusual provision that linked the
effective date to review of the Co-Chair’s Report including certification
by military leaders that they are prepared to implement repeal.289 The
statute made the effective date contingent on (1) the Secretary of Defense
receiving the Report and (2) the President, Secretary of Defense, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) certifying to the
congressional defense committees that they had considered the Report’s
recommendations and proposed plan of action.290 They also had to certify
that DoD had prepared necessary policies and regulations, and that
implementation of the policies and regulations would be consistent with
the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and
military recruiting and retention.291 Sixty days after certification, repeal
would be effective.292
Certification to the congressional defense committees occurred on
July 22, 2011, seven months after adoption of the repeal law.293 The
repeal law became effective sixty days later, on September 20, 2011, nine
months after the law was adopted and less than a year after the Working
Group released the Report.294 Any qualified gay or lesbian who wanted
to serve in the U.S. military could finally do so freely and openly.

285. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. 169, S10653 (2010) (Senator Chambliss’s remarks on how
repeal might have a negative impact on effectiveness); There are also frequent references to the
Working Group Report during the Senate debate. See 156 CONG. REC. 169, S10669-10679 (2010)
(Debate on Repeal Legislation).
286. CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 638
(2010), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll638.xml [https://perma.cc/LMX6-N9KA]; BILL
CLERK, U.S. SENATE, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 638 (2010),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&se
ssion=2&vote=00279 [https://perma.cc/W4MY-Y9MJ].
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993) (repealed 2010).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010).
293. Lee, supra note 76, at 307.
294. Id.
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LAL: At the end of the day, the final determination and assessment
was conducted by the two co-chairs, The Honorable Jeh Johnson and
General Ham. When General Ham testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee right after the Report was issued, he stated that after
nine months of study he was convinced that we could change this law,
even in a time of war.
This hearing was followed two days later by every Service chief
appearing, and the Service chiefs were asked their individual opinions.
Each four-star general and admiral was asked the “should” question.
Recall that this report and the co-chairs did not answer whether DADT
should be repealed; we answered whether it could be repealed, and if so
how. The “should” question was asked of all the Service chiefs: the Chief
of Naval Operations agreed with immediate repeal while both the Army
and Air Force Chiefs of Staff agreed with the premise of repeal but did
not believe it should occur “during a time of war.” The lone “no” came
from the Commandant of the Marine Corps who disagreed with repeal at
any time.
Following repeal, the same Marine Corps Commandant became the
first Service Chief to make a statement. He embraced the new law and
directed one of his generals to lead implementation of repeal, thereby
demonstrating his commitment to open service after Congress had passed
the repeal statute.
One senior leader called it the biggest non-event in DoD’s history,
and I am convinced that one of those reasons for the nonevent was that
this nine-month time period, this study, and this multi-party negotiation
allowed the military to have a conversation with itself.
VIII. LESSONS
The Working Group set up by the Secretary of Defense performed a
pivotal role as a de facto facilitator of this massive multiparty process.295
The Working Group and its Co-Chairs designed and executed an
elaborate process that was completed in a record amount of time (only
nine months) and helped resolve the long-standing and heated social issue
on opening U.S. military service to gays and lesbians. This landmark
process offers two lessons.
The primary lesson highlights a feature of negotiation theory that
deserves special attention in intractable disputes: the informationgathering stage. As the Working Group process demonstrated,
information-gathering can accomplish more than informing the
discussions, the conventional benefit of this negotiation stage.
Information-gathering, as executed so meticulously by the Working
295. See supra Part II.
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Group, also can help stakeholders overcome impediments and cultivate
support for the result and implementation, which are essential benefits
when resolving social issues.
The benefits of information-gathering for informing discussion are
well-recognized. What is new here is that the Working Group illustrated
an ambitious and enterprising process. A mountainous amount of
information through surveys, focus groups, research, and consultants was
generated and published to inform repeal discussions, especially the
deliberations by Congress.296 As this Article illustrated, the methods for
information-gathering did much to educate stakeholders—the deciders
and the influencers that needed to be consulted and informed.
As explained by Jonathan Lee, who served as Special Assistant to the
Co-Chair Jeh Johnson:
[The Working Group’s assessments] helped provide an
answer to the question of whether DADT could be repealed
without unacceptable impacts on the military—information
that proved important to Congress as it made its decision as
to whether DADT should be repealed. . . . [T]he information
compiled by the [Working Group] . . . served as a commonly
agreed-upon set of facts from which senior leaders in the
DoD, as well as members of Congress, could base their
positions about repeal. Prior to this, no widely accepted data
on service member attitudes existed, nor did any definitive
study of the impacts of repeal.297
After the Working Group released the Report and Implementation
Plan, as described in the Part on Commitment, Congress gave them
considerable attention during its floor debates, including making them
required reading for the President, Secretary of Defense and Chair of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff before the repeal could become effective.
The Working Group also demonstrated how to employ informationgathering to stimulate a robust consideration of key issues by
stakeholders, a consideration that can lay the foundation for a possible
policy change. This is the most noteworthy lesson from this study.
Even though the survey and focus group questions were designed
primarily to generate information to inform repeal discussions, the natural
design of the questions did much more. The questions engaged Service
members in reflecting on the repeal, including its pros and cons.
Answering the questions helped Service members overcome any status
quo bias and helped resisters, including those with value differences, to
become acclimated to the possibility of repeal. Formulating answers also
296. See infra Part VII.
297. See Lee, supra note 76, at 308.
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contributed to preparing respondents for implementing DoD-wide repeal.
Defense Secretary Gates succinctly articulated these benefits when he
remarked that “for the first time probably ever, the military actually had
a conversation with itself about this subject [DADT].”298 As elaborated
by Jonathon Lee, the Working Group
“encouraged the military to engage in a conversation with
itself about what it would mean for gays and lesbians to
serve without having to hide their identity . . . [The Working
Group’s] effort, and particularly the internal conversation it
helped spark among the force about what repeal would really
mean to them, were part of a healthy process that contributed
to a largely successful and incident-free transition to a postDADT military.”299
Mr. Lee further elaborated on how the internal conversation helped
Service members, the stakeholders most affected by repeal, to prepare for
any change: “[t]his internal conversation within the force, which took
place not only through the formal mechanisms established by the
[Working Group], but also in the everyday discussions and interactions
among service members and their families, helped service members
better come to terms with what repeal would really mean to them.”300
The other lesson from this study is straightforward and surely not new:
negotiation theory works for resolving contentious social issues. When
this elaborate process is assessed against the theoretical benchmarks
discussed in the Part on Negotiation Framework, the process seems
unremarkable. It was done by the book. Information was gathered,
stakeholders were identified and involved, their interests were uncovered
and considered, and objective standards were generated and employed to
persuade and for use as a basis for decision-making. A partial single-text
approach was employed to ensure input.
A carefully crafted resolution (the Report) was fashioned by members
of the Working Group and adopted by the Co-Chairs. The Report
addressed stakeholders’ interests and answered the ultimate question
when it concluded that the risk of DADT repeal to overall military
effectiveness was low.301 Congress crafted its own commitment in the
298. Robert Gates: Former Defense Secretary, CIA Director—and Eagle Scout, STATE
LEGISLATURES MAG., Oct.–Nov. 2015, at 22.
299. See Lee, supra note 76, at 284.
300. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
301. See DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 119 (In the final chapter of the Report that
included its recommendations, the Co-Chairs concluded that:
Based on all we saw and heard, our assessment is that, when coupled with the
prompt implementation of the recommendations we offer below, the risk of
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form of the repeal legislation that incorporated the Report as required
reading.
Throughout the process, the Working Group understood that any
result would need to be better than the stakeholders’ BATNA, the likely
judicial outcome that hovered over the entire process and kept
stakeholders at the table.
This successful backstory on the repeal of DADT should inspire
others to use these proven negotiation techniques for resolving intractable
issues with attention to how process design can bolster acceptance of the
result and its implementation. The Working Group’s informationgathering process, which did more than inform discussions, can serve as
a model for future efforts to address intractable disputes including those
that involve social change.
HA: Whenever I conduct a negotiation or mediation training
program, I commonly hear practitioners tell me how the theory is not
relevant to practice. They know what works from experience without all
the esoteric nomenclature. I agree that thoughtful and self-reflective
practitioners can figure it out based on intelligence and considerable
experience, as illustrated in this study and the one I did on Nelson
Mandela as Negotiator.302 These studies also confirm the efficaciousness
and explanatory power of the theory that can be a valuable guide to
practitioners for assessing and improving their negotiation effectiveness.
I would like to share a final observation and pose several open
questions, at least for me.
This was indeed an impressive process that must be admired for the
breadth, depth, and quality of work that was completed in only nine
months. It showed what can be done when a group has vision, resources,
expertise, and discipline. As someone who was brought up during the era
repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell to overall military effectiveness is low. We
conclude that, while a repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell will likely, in the short
term, bring about some limited and isolated disruption to unit cohesion and
retention, we do not believe this disruption will be widespread or long-lasting,
and can be adequately addressed by the recommendations we offer below.
Longer term, with a continued and sustained commitment to our core values of
leadership, professionalism, and respect for all, we are convinced that the U.S.
military can adjust and accommodate this change, just as it has others in history.
Id. at 119–29. They arrived at this overall assessment based on the survey results, misperceptions
about “open” service apparent from the survey results, risks of repeal within warfighting units,
changes possible during a time of war, resistance to change generally, lessons from history when
the military was integrated by race and gender, experiences with integration of other militaries,
experiences with integration of other domestic organizations (police and fire departments, FBI,
CIA and others), and conclusions of assessment panel. Id. at 119–29.
302. See generally Harold I. Abramson, Nelson Mandela as Negotiator: What Can We Learn
from Him?, 31 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19 (2016).
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of anti-Vietnam War protests and much hostility toward the military
among my generation and who never served in the military, the eleven
months at USAFA and research on this project gave me much to
contemplate and commend.
I end this Article with four open inquires for assessing the lessons for
future application and a few of my thoughts.
First, I wonder whether our conclusions would be verified by a followup study with stakeholders. We could not survey them ten years later
about the impact of the surveys and focus groups on overcoming values
and any status quo bias. All we know for sure is that the repeal and
transition was mostly a non-event.
Second, I wonder how easy it will be to replicate what was
accomplished. The large Working Group with a military, mission-driven
ethos appeared to be highly disciplined, well resourced, and laserfocused. I wonder how feasible it will be to replicate the lessons and
benefits in a smaller-scale multi-party process. I am optimistic and think
there are system design opportunities for engaging stakeholders that
ought to be tried (and explored in another article). For example, for a
tumultuous conflict over locating a homeless residence in a residential
neighborhood, as occurred near me during the height of the Covid-19
pandemic, an informative brochure and a thoughtful survey of local
residences followed by Zoom meetings might have led to a smoother
acceptance of this proposal to offer local, safe, and temporary living
quarters.
Third, I wonder whether the process would have succeeded if the
military and country had not already begun to become culturally
receptive to this momentous social change in 2010, although as indicated
in the Part on Information-Gathering, the Working Group helped
prepare resisters for this policy change. I wonder whether this process
would have worked seventeen years earlier, in 1993, when the ban was
initially proposed to be lifted and DADT compromise was adopted. I like
to think the process would have and might have avoided the intermediate
step of DADT.
Finally, I wonder why the resisters did not attack the credibility of the
panel’s risk assessments or the Working Group’s studies. The results
were vulnerable even though the Report, including its recommendations
and implementation plan, were substantial, thorough, and thoughtfully
presented.
The central feature of the Report, the panel’s risk assessments, was
not the product of independent, objective judgements, as examined in the
Part on Information-Gathering. The assessments were made by panel
members who were stakeholders (employees of DoD). Even though
members of the risk assessment panel were instructed that “[i]n
performing their assessment, each of the panel members should apply
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their own individual, professional judgment,” the judgements were not
made by independent experts.303 Furthermore, the entire working group’s
membership consisted of DoD employees who had an interest in the
outcome as they designed the studies that were used to inform the repeal
discussions.
Although resisters did attack the process as too rushed and the
interpretation of the surveys, I wonder whether the reason that many
resisters did not attack the credibility of the panel members, assessments,
studies, and Co-Chairs was because of their respect and deference to the
military leadership, especially the stature of the Co-Chairs.304 I suspect
that the repeal advocates would have assailed the objectivity of the
assessments if they were unfavorable.305
LAL: I would like to share a few final observations.
As we have noted in this Article, negotiations theory did not inform
how the Working Group approached its work. While I remain humbled
and proud of the work we accomplished, I do wonder whether we could
have been more effective had we recognized and intentionally applied the
tenets of multi-party negotiations.
I am grateful I crossed paths with Professor Hal Abramson. Because
of him, I grew to appreciate the critical importance of negotiations as a
skillset for military leaders. Professor Abramson helped USAFA
establish the Leadership and Appropriate Dispute Resolution (LADR)
research center. This entity is dedicated to furthering pedagogy and
research into negotiations in the military. Over 300 cadets a year now
take negotiation courses prior to commissioning in the Air Force and
Space Force. I know they will be much better equipped to lead because
of this education.
A decade has passed since the DADT repeal became effective. In that
short time, the Supreme Court has repealed the Defense of Marriage Act,
the final step in ensuring that all military families—regardless of sexual
orientation—are treated equally. Last summer,306 I officiated the
303. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 98.
304. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION ch. 6 (2007)
(considering how people can defer to authority and the appearance of authority).
305. See Sean Gibbons & Aaron Belkin, Dismantling “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. (Apr. 6, 2016), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/dismantling_dont_ask_dont_tell#
[https://perma.cc/S2AN-B8U6]. Aaron Belkin, Director of Palm Center and a leading advocate of
DADT repeal, explained how he viewed the discussion of “unit cohesion rationale” and the
“military readiness argument” as phony points for disguising homophobia, an argument that could
not be made publicly. Id. He believed any strategy for repeal had to directly confront these
cohesion and readiness arguments, which the focus group and survey result did when it concluded
the impact of repeal would be low. Id. Therefore, there was no reason for him to question the
validity of the studies. Id.
306. July 2021.
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promotion ceremony of my executive officer to O-4 (major). He and his
husband could openly celebrate this milestone with friends and
colleagues, including cadets from Spectrum, an official affinity LGBTQ
group at USAFA. The joy in the room was contagious, and yet, just a
short ten years ago, such a ceremony would not have been possible.
If you had asked me in December 2010 as Congress passed DADT
repeal, whether I would have an openly gay executive officer in a matter
of ten years, I honestly would have been skeptical. I was confident in our
implementation plan, but I anticipated a much longer time before “real”
integration would occur.
Finally, I think what the military took from this experience is the
importance of bringing together parties and stakeholders from across a
range of perspectives and bringing them together to work through a hotbutton issue. We saw the benefits of holding a conversation in and of
itself. The military unwittingly validated the negotiations process on one
of the toughest social issues of our time. And while the end result may not
have made everyone happy, the outcome was accepted, we could move
on and we did.
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Your terms of reference are attached. By copy of this memorandum, all
DoD Components will fully cooperate in the execution of this Review and be
responsive to all requests for information, detail personnel, or other support. The
working group shall submit its report to me by December I, 2010.

Attachment(s):
As stated

cc:
Secretaries of the Military Departments
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
General Counsel of the Department of Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
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TERMS OF REFERENCE
Comprehensive Review on the Implementation of a Repeal of 10
U.S.C. § 654
These Terms of Reference (TOR) establish the objectives of the
Secretary ofDefense- directed Comprehensive Review for the
Repeal of IO U.S.C. § 654,"Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the
Armed Forces." The Review will examine the issues associated with
repeal of the law should it occur and will include an implementation
plan that addresses the impacts, if any, on the Department.
Objectives and Scope:
The Review will identify the impacts to the force of a repeal of IO
U.S.C § 654 in the areas reflected below:
1. Determine any impacts to military readiness, military effectiveness
and unit cohesion, recruiting/retention, and family readiness that may
result from repeal of the law and recommend any actions that should
be taken in light of such impacts.
2. Determine leadership, guidance, and training on standards of
conduct and new policies.
3. Determine appropriate changes to existing policies and regulations,
including but not limited to issues regarding personnel management,
leadership and training, facilities, investigations, and benefits.
4. Recommend appropriate changes (if any) to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.
5. Monitor and evaluate existing legislative proposals to repeal IO
U.S.C § 654 and proposals that may be introduced in the Congress
during the period of the review.
6. Assure appropriate ways to monitor the workforce climate and
military effectiveness that support successful follow-through on
implementation.
7. Evaluate the issues raised in ongoing litigation involving 10 U.S.C
§ 654.
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Methodology:
1. Review all DoD directives, instructions and other issuances
potentially impacted by a repeal. Identify where new directives and
instructions may be needed.
2. Ensure participation in the working group by: military service
leadership; appropriate OSD staff elements; cross service officer and
enlisted communities; mid-grade and senior ranks; human
resources/personnel specialists; pay and benefits specialists; family
support programs specialists; accession point and training
communities; service academies and/or senior service schools; and
medical, legal and religious support personnel.
3. In an appropriately balanced manner, engage Members of
Congress, key influencers of potential service members and other
stakeholder groups that have expressed a view on the current and
perspective policy.
4. Research/study methods shall include systematic engagement of
all levels of the force and their families, analysis of current data and
information, and review the experiences of foreign militaries.
5. Engage the RAND Corporation to update the National Defense
Research Institute report on "Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military
Personnel Policy: Options and Assessment" (1993).
Deliverables:
▪

A Report addressing the areas above will be delivered to the
Secretary of Defense not later than December 1, 2010. Prior to
the delivery of the report to the Secretary of Defense, each
Service Chief shall be afforded the opportunity to review and
comment.

▪

The Review will provide a plan of action to support the
implementation of a repeal of the law. The Review shall identify
areas for further study.

Support:
▪

The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial
Officer will provide adequate funding for the Review.
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▪

The DA&M, through Washington Headquarters Services, will
coordinate for and provide human resources, office/facilities, and
other support to ensure success of this effort.

▪

The Military Departments and other DOD Components will
provide full support to the Review with detail personnel,
information (including but not limited to documents and
interviews of personnel), analytical capacity as determined
necessary and any other support as requested.
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Appendix B
Negotiation Framework
This Appendix on the Negotiation Framework is offered as a primer
for understanding key benchmarks that are used throughout this Article
to assess the Working Group’s multiparty negotiation process. The
framework is built around the metaphor of a circle307 that offers a map of
the process that begins with preparation before entering the circle to
negotiate and ends with two options for exiting the circle and concluding
the negotiation.
Before Entering Circle to Negotiate
Parties ought to prepare before they go inside the circle to negotiate.
This is not a novel idea although it is not always done or done well.
Parties should first build relationships and gather information they may
need for negotiating inside the circle.
Building Relationships
Any negotiation is likely to go more smoothly if parties have a
working relationship before going inside the circle. There is much that
parties can do to try to develop rapport and possibly some trust.
Relationship building can take place during small talk, meals, and random
encounters when parties can show appreciation and respect for each other
and possibly connect over similar experiences and interests. When the
Working Group was designing studies and surveying interested parties as
part of its information-gathering, the Working Group was in contact with
a large number of stakeholders over matters not inside the negotiation
circle. These interactions provided opportunities to cultivate rapport and
possibly trust in advance of any negotiations. As one example, the
facilitators’ opening script for focus group meetings, with respondents
whose buy-in was needed, reads like a textbook description of building
rapport.308 The facilitators were scripted to demystify the process and try
to make respondents comfortable before asking questions about the
DADT policy.309 This feature of negotiations will not be delved into other
307. See Bruce Patton, Building Relationships and the Bottom Line: The Circle of Value
Approach to Negotiation, NEGOT., Apr. 1, 2004, at 4–7 [hereinafter Patton, Circle of Value]; Bruce
Patton, Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 279 (Michael L. Moffitt &
Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) [hereinafter Patton, Negotiation].
308. See WESTAT, SUPPORT TO THE DOD COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW WORKING GROUP
ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF REPEALING “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” app. A (2010) (They were told
to explain that this is a voluntary process, that anyone could leave if they want to, that no one
would be penalized for leaving, and that participants are encouraged to speak if have something
to say.).
309. Id.

222

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 32

than to note that the Working Group and its consultants gave some
attention to this preparatory step.
Information-Gathering (Communications)
Parties should gather in advance the information they will need inside
the circle. As a first step, parties might preliminarily frame neutrally the
issues that they want to resolve. The “issues” are what bring people
together at the table to negotiate like “will there be an impact on military
effectiveness if repeal occurs?” Issues are the source of possible conflict
between parties that they should identify and consider before going inside
the circle.
Parties interested in the dispute should be identified in advance.
Interested parties, known as stakeholders, have a stake in the outcome
and will be affected by any resolution. All key stakeholders need to be
involved to some degree for one simple reason. Left out stakeholders can
delegitimize the negotiation and derail any implementation. As examined
in this Article’s discussion of Stakeholders, a large number were
identified and engaged in various ways in the repeal consideration
process.
Parties should gather the information that they will need inside the
circle. Information-gathering process includes learning the parties’
interests, developing possible options for resolution, and identifying
potential objective standards to guide the negotiation, as will be explored
next on negotiating inside the circle. In this repeal consideration, a
massive amount of information was amassed. As this Article’s Part on
Information-Gathering illustrated, the information was used for more
than informing the negotiations; the techniques for gathering the
information also helped build support and possible buy-in for whatever
the outcome might be.
Finally, it may be helpful for parties to develop in advance a draft
agenda that might include, among other matters, the issues to be resolved
and whether any additional information needs to be gathered. An early
agenda should be tentative and further developed and refined when inside
the circle.
Negotiating Inside the Circle
After parties have prepared, they are ready to go inside the circle to
negotiate. This description will focus on three key elements although
each one opens a door to more inquiries and opportunities.
Interests
The central feature of the interest-based model is to identify the
interests of the parties, thus the model’s name. And there is a compelling
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justification for viewing the interest inquiry as central. The interest lens
shifts the focus of the negotiation from exchanging positions (what
parties want as a solution) to discussing interests (what is motivating the
parties to want the particular solution). By giving attention to “why”
parties want what they want, parties can learn the underlying reasons a
party prefers a particular outcome (solution). By understanding the
reasons, parties can move the negotiations along a pathway that
commences with identifying interests and progresses toward generating
new options and selecting optimum resolutions.
When a party opposed DADT repeal, for example, all that the other
parties learned was the solution the party wanted. Advocating for a
particular solution does not reveal why the party wanted that result. When
asked why a party opposed repeal, the party’s reply can reveal valuable
information about his motivating interests. A party might explain that he
was worried that the presence of gay and lesbian Service members would
undermine military effectiveness. That answer would change the focus
away from debating for and against repeal and toward a more useful
inquiry. The discussion would move toward figuring out the impact of
gay and lesbian Service members on military effectiveness—a more
meaningful inquiry that also would address parties’ underlying likely
shared interests in an effective military.
Options
Option-building is the stage when negotiators can get creative. After
identifying interests, parties should generate multiple options for meeting
them. This crucial feature of interest-based negotiations may not feel
natural for parties to do. Option-building through brainstorming requires
a disciplined and focused effort to generate a list of options without
parties simultaneously assessing each option as the list is being compiled.
The options are assessed afterwards and separately.
For example, parties might first brainstorm multiple options for
researching the impact of repeal on military effectiveness. Options might
include surveying domestic police departments without a bar, militaries
in other countries where repeal has taken place, current Service members
experiences, current gay and lesbian Service members experiences, and
independent experts. Notice how the option-building shifts the discussion
from a “for or against repeal” debate to generating options for assessing
the impact of repeal on military effectiveness, which would presumably
address a common interest of all parties. Deciding which is the best
option takes a negotiator to the last element inside the circle.
Claiming
After interests have been identified and options generated, it is time
for parties to make decisions. Parties need to select options that not only
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meet their interests but are also better than their alternatives to settlement.
There are different ways to do what has been described as the third
element inside the circle, Claiming. Parties can claim by using objective
standards, trading, and positional negotiations.310
The preferred claiming technique is to identify objective standards
that can be the basis for justifying the selection of the options. This
technique can reduce posturing by inducing parties to work together to
identify relevant standards.
An objective standard is one that is trustworthy, independent of the
parties, and fair. For example, when negotiating for a salary, instead of
exchanging strategic offers and counteroffers and splitting the difference
(positional negotiations), parties might agree to a salary based on a
formula like the average salary or slightly above average salary for that
job in the relevant region. This would be an objective standard because
neither party can sway the average salary amount. The standard is derived
from information that is independent of the parties and can be trusted as
objective.
An objective standard relevant to DADT surveys of Service members
might be the standards employed by social scientists for designing valid
surveys. Then parties would select a survey option that would most likely
meet the standards, like a survey that used random selection of
participants and questions that have been tested to be non-biased. Part VI
of this Article considers the use of objective standards by the working
group and their impact on the negotiations.
Parties also can claim by trading options. A party can offer something
of low value to the offering party that might be of high value to another
party. For example, one party may offer to endorse surveying U.S.
Service members that another party might view as a high priority in return
for that party endorsing a high priority for the offering party such as
gathering studies on the impact of repeal in other countries. Although the
trade as a package could be viewed as an option when generating options,
at the claiming stage parties also might select the two options by making
a trade during the claiming stage.
Use of objective standards and trading can move parties most of way
toward resolution, but sometimes there may be a few remaining issues
310. Bruce Patton, when describing the seven-element problem-solving model, identified the
third element within the circle as “Legitimacy,” which includes standards, as a basis for justifying
selecting an option that is fair. In contrast, he characterizes a trade as a possible option as part of
option-building. In this Article, we label the third element as Claiming and group three techniques
under the heading. In addition to legitimacy (standards), we include trading and positional
negotiations, as three techniques for claiming as parties move toward resolution and commitment.
See Patton, supra note 307, at 279; HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION:
ADVOCATING AS A PROBLEM-SOLVER 74 (3d ed. 2013).
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that can be more efficiently resolved through the old-fashioned positional
negotiation dance of offers and counteroffers. For example, both parties
might agree to survey Service members but disagree on the number of
people to be surveyed. One party might want to survey 100,000 Service
members which both parties agree would meet the standard for statistical
validity. But the other party might prefer to survey 200,000 people
because the party thinks a larger survey would be more persuasive. The
first party might view doubling the size of the sample as a waste of money
and time when a 100,000 sample can be easily defended as valid. Parties
might negotiate over the number to be surveyed with one party
counteroffering with a 175,000. The other party might counter with
125,000 and then the parties might split the difference at 150,000 samplesize. This method can be more efficient if not employed prematurely than
tenaciously applying an objective standard that justifies 100,000 sample.
Positional negotiations can be a handy claiming method to employ toward
the end of the negotiations as parties are preparing to exit the circle.
Exiting the Circle to Conclude the Negotiations
Parties can exit the circle in one of two ways.
Commitment
If the parties reach a settlement, they shift their focus to solidifying
their commitment. Parties want to be sure that everyone is on the same
page regarding the details of any agreement and how to implement it.
When entering this last stage, parties, who have reached an agreement in
principle inside the circle, may encounter unresolved details when
finalizing the agreement. As discussed at the end of this Article, the
Working Group, Co-Chairs, and Congress reached the Commitment
stage.
BATNA
If parties fail to reach a settlement, they usually do so because their
BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement)311 seems more
attractive than the agreement emerging in the circle. In many cases,
including the DADT negotiations, the BATNA can be a judicial decision
that would resolve the dispute if the parties don’t. As examined in Part V,
a judicial outcome was an unattractive BATNA for many stakeholders,
which motivated them to negotiate over repeal where they thought they
would have more control and could achieve a better outcome.
Finally, although organizing these negotiation elements around
entering the circle, inside the circle, and exiting it may suggest a neat
311. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING
GIVING IN 99–108 (3d ed. rev. 2011).
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sequencing of stages, negotiation reality is much messier or, to put it more
eloquently, more dynamic. In practice, two or more elements can be in
play at the same time, like gathering information outside the circle while
simultaneously identifying interests inside the circle. Or parties can
regress after relationships become strained inside the circle while parties
are learning interests, as another example. Then, parties may retreat to
repair relationships before returning inside the circle to further
understand interests. Negotiations are a fast-moving, dynamic process.
This circle provides a map with benchmarks to track and assess what is
happening, in a negotiation.
Plus Techniques
We will briefly identify two additional techniques that were
employed, to some degree, by the Working Group when informally
facilitating this multiparty process.
I-C-N Framework
Any facilitator should give attention to the role of each stakeholder
when structuring the involvement of the stakeholders. Although all
stakeholders, by definition, have an interest in the outcome, not all of
them are necessarily deciders. A stakeholder’s role can be classified
based on its degree of involvement in the negotiations, as clarified in the
I-C-N decision-making tool where stakeholders are grouped into three
categories: Who decides? Who should be consulted? And, who should be
informed?312 In the Article’s discussion of Stakeholders, the numerous
stakeholders involved with the DADT repeal discussions were classified
into one of these three categories for engagement.
One-Text Procedure313
In a process with numerous parties, a facilitator should consider
employing a one-text procedure for managing the flow of proposals in
order to avoid confusion that can be caused by circulating multiple,
conflicting proposals that can be difficult to track.
The one-text procedure begins with the facilitator first listening to
different views and priorities of the parties, learning different interests,
and drafting a possible agreement. Then, the facilitator asks parties to
criticize the first draft by explaining why it does not meet their interests.
And so begins an iterative process: the facilitator re-drafts when in a
listening and learning mode; listens to reactions by parties, which does
not require any concessions by them; and presents a new draft, without a
recommendation, for further reactions. The facilitator continues this
312. JEFF WEISS, HBR GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING 112–16 (2016).
313. FISHER ET AL., supra note 88, at 112–16.
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iterative process until the facilitator thinks there is nothing else that can
be done to meet parties’ interests. For this last step, the facilitator presents
a recommended final draft for the parties to either accept or reject.
This one-text procedure can be valuable for two party disputes and
essential for multiparty ones. Perhaps the most famous illustration was
when it was used by President Carter in 1978 when mediating the historic
Camp David peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. After thirteen days
and around twenty-three drafts, President Carter recommended the last
draft and Egypt and Israel accepted it.314
As considered in this Article’s Part on Commitment, the Secretary of
Defense’s Directive called for and the Working Group employed a partial
version of the one-text procedure before the Working Group and CoChairs finalized its Report and Implementation Plan.

314. FISHER ET AL., supra note 88, at 116.
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Appendix C
Information-Gathering Surveys and Studies
This Appendix provides a list of the massive number of informationgathering initiatives undertaken by the Working Group and considered
when the final reports and recommendations were formulated. This
summary is divided into three parts: surveys and studies that qualified as
objective standards, surveys and studies that did not, and assessments
produced by the risk assessment panel of the Working Group.
1. Surveys and Studies that Met Objective Standards
Westat Surveys315
The Westat surveys were the only ones that were intended to produce
“statistically valid results suitable for quantitative analysis.”316 Westat,
an independent research and statistical survey firm, was contracted by the
Working Group to conduct two large-scale surveys that were
designed to measure perceptions of how repeal might affect
military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion,
morale, family readiness, military community life,
recruitment, and retention. The Surveys were not designed
to be a referendum on issue of DADT repeal, nor can survey
results alone answer the question of whether repeal should
or should not occur. The surveys can, however, contribute to
the decision making process by providing information on
what Service members and their spouses think will be the
likely impact of repeal.317
The large-scale Service Members’ Survey of 103 questions with
subparts initially targeted 200,000 Service members, but the target was
doubled to 400,000 at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. The
response rate was in-line with other DoD surveys of 28% (115,000
Service members). It was one of the largest surveys ever done within the
U.S. military.318
The large-scale Spouse Survey of 43 questions with subparts was
undertaken to learn about spouses’ attitudes and the potential “impact of
315. WESTAT, 1 SUPPORT TO THE DOD COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW WORKING GROUP
ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF REPEALING “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” app. A (2010) [hereinafter
WESTAT REPORT VOLUME 1].
316. See Jonathan Lee, The Comprehensive Review Working Group and Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell Repeal at the Department of Defense, 60 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 282, 308 (2013).
317. WESTAT REPORT VOLUME 1, supra note 315, at 1 (emphasis added).
318. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” 36–38 (2010) [hereinafter DADT
REPORT].
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repeal on recruiting, retention, and family readiness.” The survey, which
was sent to 150,186 spouses of Service members, resulted in 44,266
responses for a 30% response rate.319 The results of these perception
surveys were given considerable attention in the final reports and
recommendations as discussed in the Article under the Parts on
information-gathering and commitments.
RAND Study Update
The Secretary of Defense directed the Working Group to engage
RAND, an independent research firm,320 to update its influential 1993
RAND Study on Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel, in part
as a response to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Senator Carl Levin, and ranking member, Senator John McCain.321 The
original study greatly influenced the adoption of the 1993 DADT statute.
RAND’s updated 2010 study addressed four key issues:
• How has the environment changed within and outside the
military over the 17years since the inception of DADT?
• How might repeal of DADT affect military readiness and
effectiveness, such as recruitment and retention, unit
cohesion, and force health?
• What do military personnel, including currently serving
gay men and lesbians, think about repeal?
• What has been the experience of other institutions in which
gay people currently serve, work, and study?322
The new study centered on updating nine areas, which included
examining the experiences of seven foreign governments;323 collecting
information on the experiences of domestic police and fire departments,
FBI, CIA, U.S. AID, and State Department;324 researching recruitment
and retention experiences since 1993;325 conducting 22 focus groups with
319. Id. at 38. The surveys could not include partners/spouses of gays and lesbians because
their names were not in the DoD databases. Id. Only married couples were included, and under
federal law at the time (DOMA-Defense of Marriage Act), marriage could only be between a man
and women. Id.
320. RAND is an independent research organization that was formed after WWII to focus
on military planning. Its two core values are quality and objectivity. See A Brief History of RAND,
RAND, https://www.rand.org/about/history.html (last visited May 26, 2022).
321. RAND, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: AN UPDATE OF
RAND’S 1993 STUDY v (2010), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1056.html.
322. Id. at xix.
323. Id. at 275
324. Id. at 322, 324.
325. Id. at 167.
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Service members;326 conducting a limited survey of gay and lesbian
service personnel on DADT;327 an updating report on unit cohesion and
performance since adoption of DADT;328 an updating report on
prevalence of homosexuality in the general population and military;329
researching health issues within the gay and lesbian community;330
examining developments in military personnel policy and public
opinion;331 and conducting a literature review and field observations on
how organizations have changed policies concerning sexual orientation
in workplace and other relevant contexts.332
The RAND Report made the following findings if DADT were
repealed: the impact on recruitment would be small and any negative
impact on retention would likely be offset by increases due to
reenlistment bonuses, military pay, and allowances; there was little
reason to expect notable deterioration in unit performance; increased
rates of HIV infection were unlikely; and other health issues would
probably not substantially affect readiness.333
The RAND updated report served as additional input into the Working
Group’s assessment and recommendations. The Report’s key findings
were consistent with the Working Group’s own studies but also generated
new information.334
Law as a Source of Standards
Law, which is customarily formulated by an independent third party
(legislatures and courts), can be a source of objective standards in
negotiations and influence if not control what parties do. In the repeal
discussions, the federal law, DOMA (Defense of Marriage Act) 335 was a
legal standard that controlled portions of any repeal implementation plan.
DOMA defined marriage as only between a man and woman. Any
implementation plan had to comply with this federal law and therefore
could not offer gay and lesbian couples family medical benefits, married
housing, or collocation opportunities if the Service members as a couple
wanted assignments near each other, among other benefits that were only
available for couples that met the statutory definition of marriage. Of

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at 233.
RAND, supra note 321, at 255.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 351.
RAND, supra note 321, at xxii–xxiii.
DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 43–44.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2020).
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course, other laws also were available as objective standards, such as the
conflicting court decisions on the legality of DADT.
HA: The Weststat large-scale surveys and the notes from the Service
member and spouse focus groups in the next Section generated a rich
understanding of views, or as the Weststat Report indicated, their
“perceptions.” The resulting report reflected what was happening on the
ground including any prejudices of respondents at that moment in time.
It offered a revealing snapshot across the services. I would like to think
that if the surveys were repeated today, the perception results would be
much more positive. The Westat report was useful at the time for
developing the implementation plan because it flagged what obstacles
needed to be overcome.
I also think it is worth noting what these surveys did not cover. They
never considered whether gay and lesbian Service members have the
physical, cognitive, or emotional abilities to serve effectively. I suspect
that after the 1993 RAND study concluded homosexuality was “not
germane” to serving in the military and recommended holding all Service
members to the same standards,336 the capabilities of gays and lesbians
were no longer an issue. The surveys primarily measured the reactions
of straight Service members and their families to the presence of gays
and lesbians in the military and whether those reactions might undermine
military effectiveness.
2. Surveys and Studies that Did Not Meet Objective Standards
These informal surveys and research studies that also were considered
by the Working Group and Co-Chairs did not qualify as objective
standards in that they were not produced independent of the stakeholders
and did not appear to follow research protocols for producing statistically
sound surveys or studies, other than Westat analyzing the qualitative data
from the forums below. The surveys and studies involved a diverse mix
of stakeholders and experts.
Military Service Members and Spouses Forums
Westat analyzed the notes and five sets of qualitative data from five
forums. It identified systematic themes. The summaries of the forums
below are from the Working Group’s Report; a more detailed analysis is
available in a Report prepared by Westat.337
336. Bernard D. Rostker et al., RAND CORPORATION, Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military
Personnel Policy: Options and Assessment, xxiv (1993), https://rand.org/pubs/monograph_
reports/MR323.html.
337. See WESTAT, 1 SUPPORT TO THE DOD COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW WORKING GROUP
ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF REPEALING “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” 1 (2010) [hereinafter WESTAT
REPORT VOLUME 2] (noting that he number of inputs are a little different than what was reported
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-95 information exchange forums (IEF) were held at 51
installations that engaged 24,000 active duty, guard and reserve
Service members.338
-140 Service members participated in Focus Groups of 9–12
participants, as a follow-on to the IEFs, that probed deeper in an
effort to understand views “in a more intimate and relaxed
setting.” Trained facilitators from Westat led the sessions.339
-72,384 confidential comments were collected via an “Online
Inbox” from Service members and their families who could
anonymously express their views through a website.340
- 2691 Service members and family members including 296
who self-identified as gay, lesbian, or bisexual were engaged in a
customized survey mechanism that was designed to reach Service
members who are gay and lesbian and wanted to share their
thoughts and concerns about DADT. Any survey was constrained
by the then applicable law that would result in discharging any
known gay and lesbian Service members. Westat designed and
in the Working Group’s Report). Westat summarized the five sets of qualitative data it examined
as follows:
1. Notes from 81 Information Exchange Forums (IEFs) and 29 Leadership
Discussion Groups (Discussion Groups).
2. Notes from 119 Service Member Small Member Focus Groups (military focus
groups) conducted with Service members at these same locations.
3. Notes from 7 Family Small Focus Groups, 9 Family Readiness Coordinator
Discussion Groups, and 12 Family Information Exchange Forums (Family IEFs)
and 4 Service Member IEFs with family members attending.
4. Transcripts of 160 on-line dialogs from the confidential communication
mechanism web site, 80 with Service members who identified themselves as gay,
lesbian, bisexual or uncertain of their sexual orientation and 80 with those selfidentifying as heterosexual.
5. Inbox comments: for Phase 1, a total of 546 free-form verbatim “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” inbox comments received during April, May and June, roughly twice
as many from females as from males; for Phase 2: 1505 inbox comments received
from April through August, divided more or less equally by Service.”
Id. at viii.
338. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 33–34.
339. Id. at 34–35.
340. Id. at 35.
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managed a confidential communication mechanism that
supplemented the safeguards afforded in the other surveys to
safely engage gay and lesbian Service members in a live
interactive online exchange with Westat moderators. The secured
confidentiality protocols were designed to give the Service
members confidence to discuss issues related to their service
without fear that the information might be disclosed and lead to
an investigation and discharge under DADT.341
Interest Groups For and Against Repeal
The Working Group enlisted a large number of interested
organizations for advice and views including prominent advocates for
and against DADT repeal. They held meetings with over fifteen groups
and organizations.342 According to the Report, the views solicited from
these diverse groups did much to “inform the assessment and
recommendations in this report.”343
Other Stakeholders
The Working Group met with fifteen same-sex partners of gay and
lesbian current Service members.344 It consulted current and former
military chaplains in groups and as individuals, drawn from the full
spectrum of religious affiliations. It also consulted chaplains’ endorsing
organizations (202 of them).345 It met with Service Surgeons Generals to
discuss medical issues and reached out to the American Medical
Association, American Psychological Association, and Gay and Lesbian
Medical Association.346 It solicited input from more than twenty veteran
and Military Service organizations by meeting with them and soliciting
written input, including meeting with a number of gay and lesbian
veterans.347 The Working Group solicited views of several members of
Congress and their staff.348

341. Id. at 38–39.
342. Id. at 40. The organizations and groups included: Alliance Defense Fund, Center for
American Progress, Center for Military Readiness, Center for Security Policy, Family Research
Council, Focus on the Family, Heritage Foundation, Human Rights Campaign, Liberty Counsel,
OutServe, Palm Center for the Study of Sexuality in the Military, Service Members Legal Defense
Network, SLDN Military Outreach Committee, Service Members United, and USMA Knights
Out. Id.
343. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 40.
344. Id. at 41. The meeting occurred on September 16, 2010. Id. at 41.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 41–42.
348. DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 42.
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Fiscal Assessment
The Working Group identified likely net implementation costs of
repeal in view of the policy changes that would result from full
integration of gays and lesbians.349
Legal and Policy Review
The Working Group undertook an extensive legal and policy review
in order to assess and recommend changes to policies if DADT were
repealed. Based on in-depth analysis, input from the force, and
consultation with policy experts, “the Working Group developed a range
of potential courses of action for each issue area.”350 It conveyed policy
options and recommended an approach to the Executive Committee
whose comments informed the ultimate recommendations and any
implementation plan.351
Leadership, Education, and Training Experts
“The Working Group worked with the Services’ training experts,
Service academy staff, and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management
Institute to define education and training requirements in the event of
repeal and to develop leadership, education, and training guidance and
tools.”352
Scholars and Researchers
The Working Group engaged academic and research sources
including scholars from the military service academies. The military
scholars prepared white papers relevant to the repeal on a wide range of
subjects—on philosophy and ethics, organizational behavior including
unit cohesion, psychology, sociology, management, religion and
morality.353 Historians from DoD and the Services provided historical
insights and compiled past surveys and experiences with racial and
gender integration in the military.354 The Working Group also hosted
meetings with faculty, scholars and researchers from the military
academies, war colleges, research laboratories, and civilian academia
with relevant expertise.355

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
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Id. at 45.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 45–46.
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Foreign Militaries
The Working Group reached out to foreign militaries to learn about
their experiences with the integration of gay and lesbian personnel. 356 It
contacted representatives of all nation members of NATO. Co-Chair of
the Working Group, General Ham, had conversations with counterparts
in the European and Israeli militaries. Members of the Working Group
attended relevant conferences and learned about integration experiences
from senior military officers and experts in Australia, Britain, Canada,
Israel, and Sweden, including gaining a detailed understanding of the
transition experiences from the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia
with an emphasis on learning lessons that have already been learned.357
3. Risk Assessments by the Working Group’s Panel
In this Section, we describe the role of the risk assessment panel and
its methodology. Before the risk assessment panel was constituted, the
Working Group defined the outcome that the panel would be measuring:
What would be the impact of repeal on “military effectiveness”? 358 This
standard is a widely used one for evaluating choices made by or for the
military.
The Working Group formulated a definition of “military
effectiveness” based on its parts identified in the Terms of Reference.359
The Working Group concluded that assessing “Military Effectiveness”
required measuring two primary components: “Military Readiness” and
“Unit Cohesion.”360 The “Military Readiness” component could be
measured by assessing several subcomponents including “Family
Readiness,” “Retention,” and “Recruiting.”361 The “Unit Cohesion”
component could be measured by assessing subcomponents of “Task
Cohesion” and “Social Cohesion.”362
These components and subcomponents and their relationship to each
other are depicted in Figure 6 below.363 Each of these components and
subcomponents needed to be measured because when taken together, they
answered the ultimate question on the impact of repeal on “Military
Effectiveness.”

356.
357.
358.
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360.
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See id.
See id.
DADT REPORT, supra note 11, at 99.
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After each component and subcomponent had been specified by the
Working Group, it selected the Assessment Panel to measure the impact
of repeal:
The panel was selected to represent all the Services and a
wide range of ages, grades, warfare specialties, and
experiences. The assessment panel included military
officers, three senior non-commissioned officers, and
several DoD career civilians. The panel consisted of combat
arms personnel, aviators, surface combat personnel, an
intelligence officer, a personnel specialist, family readiness
specialists, a recruiter, a judge advocate, an aeromedical
officer, and a military researcher. Eight of the panel
members were part of the Working Group, including three
Working Group members who were brought into the
Working Group specifically because of their recent
operational experience. For most of the review, the panel
consisted of 11 members; for the family readiness review,
the panel was increased to 15 members. In performing their
assessment, each of the panel members applied their own
individual, professional judgment. Through inclusion of
panel members representing the operational communities in
each service, the concerns and views of those communities
were both heard and incorporated into the panel
deliberations.364

364. Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
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The panel engaged in a multi-step process for assessing each
subcomponent and component.
The panel first reviewed relevant scholarly and other materials,
including what was learned from the numerous surveys/studies and other
methods used to systematically engage the force and their families. It
considered the experiences of others with open service, studied expert
statements, and heard expert presentations. Then, the panel members
deliberated among themselves to arrive at individual (not group)
assessments for each subcomponent.
They did this by each panel member mapping risk assessments for
each subcomponent. Each member selected a number from 1 to 10 along
a horizonal bar chart bound by Low Risk at one end and High Risk at the
other end for each subcomponent.365 Each individual numeric rating
reflected the risk posed by repeal for each subcomponent.366
The individual assessments of the panel members for each
subcomponent were totaled and divided by the number of assessments to
produce an average risk assessment for each subcomponent.367 For
example, each member offered a numeric risk rating for the impact of
repeal on subcomponent task cohesion. One panel member might give a
risk rating of 4. A rating of 4 on a scale of ten would be a moderate risk.
Then, risk ratings of all the panel members were totaled for the
subcomponent and averaged to arrive at a single risk assessment number
for task cohesion. In the Report, that number was 3.3.368 This averaging
process produced results that reflected the collective judgement of the
Panel.
The panel members also developed relative weights for the various
subcomponents. For example, after considering scores of scholarly
articles and the two subcomponents of Unit Cohesion, the panel gave
greater relative weight to Task Cohesion subcomponent (.84) over Social
Cohesion subcomponent (.16).369 Figure 6 above shows the relative
weights for various subcomponents.
The panel applied the relative weights to each average risk
assessment.370 For example, for unit cohesion, the combined assessments
of panel members yielded a risk rating of LOW–MODERATE for task
cohesion (3.3) and of MODERATE–HIGH for social cohesion (6.3)
before mitigation measures were considered.371 Given the greater relative
importance of task cohesion over social cohesion, the panel rated the
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
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overall repeal risk on unit cohesion as LOW–MODERATE” (3.8).372 See
Figure 8 Bar Chart for mapping of unit cohesion risk before mitigation.373

Each panel member did two assessments for each subcomponent: The
first assessment considered the impact of repeal before any risk
mitigation.374 The risk values before any mitigation gave Congress, the
Service Branches, and the White House an idea of how each
subcomponent and military effectiveness would be affected if repeal were
immediate due to judicial invalidation of DADT.
The second assessment assumed that recommendations for risk
mitigation were adopted and there would be time for an orderly repeal
transition.375 See Figure 9 Bar Chart for mapping of unit cohesion risk
after mitigation.376 The mitigation recommendations were designed to
lessen any potential negative impact that repeal would have on “military
effectiveness.” Recommendations included policy modifications,
additional training and education, and leadership actions.377 Unit
Cohesion risk dropped from 3.8 to 2.6.

Id.
Id.
DADT REPORT, supra note 8, at 103.
DADT REPORT, supra note 8, at 103.Id.
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See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUPPORT PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION, REPORT OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T
TELL” app. D [hereinafter DADT PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION].
372.
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This elaborate process for assessing repeal risks was observed and
evaluated by a “red team” that watched the assessment process from a
separate room. This is a commonly employed safeguard in the military.378
As explained in the Report:
The purpose of the red team was to critically evaluate the
application of the methodology by the assessment panel, to
ensure that the methodology was applied fairly and
objectively, and that the assessment was based on relevant
data and subject matter expertise. The red team was
composed of seven individuals, co-led by a general officer
[an officer with a rank of general] and a career SES civilian
[Senior Executive Services that is the civilian equivalent of
a general rank], with personnel from each Service, as well as
civilian analysts that specialized in red teaming. The red
team was provided with the same information as the panel
members and was able to hear and see everything during the
assessment. The red team provided a summary report noting
areas of concern with regard to methodology, discussion of
ratings, group dynamics, and weaknesses in logic and
analysis.
The red team noted that, in general, the assessment panel’s
conclusions and assessments were somewhat more
conservative (i.e., presuming greater risk) than warranted
given the data and information considered. Additionally,
although the panel members did not always agree on their
assessment of risk, panel deliberations were noted to be
thoughtful, dispassionate, and without undue influence by
one panel member.379
These two risk assessments (before and after mitigation), that were a
product of this elaborate process, were completed by the Panel for each
of the 18 components and subcomponents.380 The Panel provided the
378. Id. at 100–01.
379. DADT REPORT, supra note 8, at 100–01.
380. Id. at 97.
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various results to the Working Group’s co-chairs who formulated the
overall risk assessments for both scenarios.
LAL: I served as a member of both assessment panels. While I already
was well versed in the information gathered by the Working Group, this
role required even more immersion. As a panel member, I read scores of
research papers, policy papers, survey results, and more that was
available to us in the “Reading Room.” Then, over multiple days in
October, I joined the other panel members in a small conference room in
the depths of the Pentagon basement. This was the same room where
wargaming exercises and analysis about future conflicts is conducted.
Over those days, we discussed and wrestled with the wide array of issues
facing repeal—from unit cohesion to overall military readiness. We each
evaluated the risk should appeal occur immediately and then again if
DoD was allowed time to complete its implementation plan. We knew that
history would judge not only our conclusions but the way in which we
came to them.
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Appendix D
Westat

Possible Revisions to
CRWG Small Focus Group Script
Introduction

Time for Introduction: 5 minutes

Good morning/afternoon. My name is
and I am with the
Department of Defense Comprehensive Review Working Group.
This is the working group the Secretary of Defense directed to
conduct a comprehensive review of the issues associated with repeal
of the law commonly known as “Don't Ask, Don’t Tell.” My
colleagues with me this morning/afternoon are
and
.
We have asked you to be here to gain your perspective on issues, if
any, associated with repeal. Your help is essential to our review.
Background

Let's begin by talking about why we are conducting focus groups.
In his State of the Union Address, the President called on Congress
to repeal the law commonly known as "Don't Ask, Don't Ask Tell."
A repeal of the law will mean that servicemembers will no longer
be separated from the armed forces because they have engaged in
homosexual conduct, which includes saying they are gay. The
Working Group will examine the issues that might arise if the law
were repealed, should it occur, and will develop an implementation
plan that addresses any possible impacts on DOD.
As a preliminary step to developing a plan, we are conducting
surveys and focus groups with military personnel and their spouses
to learn what, if any, impact a change in the law would have on
military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion,
recruiting/retention, family readiness, and other issues, and how to
best manage any such impacts during implementation. This focus
group is an opportunity for you to share your insights directly with
the Working Group.
Ground Rules
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First, this is a voluntary focus group. You were chosen at random
to be invited to participate in the focus group. If you prefer not to sit
in on this focus group, you are free to leave. If you decide to stay, I
will be asking your perspectives on several issues concerning a
possible repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell. We plan on discussing this
issue in depth for one hour and will end at (give specific end time).
If you decide to stay, this is not a confidential forum. So please do
not identify your own sexual orientation or identify anyone else you
believe may be gay or lesbian. The current Don't Ask, Don't Tell
law is still in effect. The "Don't Ask" part of the policy means that
servicemembers aren't asked their sexual orientation when they join
the military, and commanders are only allowed to ask if there is
credible information that a servicemember engaged in homosexual
conduct. The "Don't Tell" part of the policy means that if
servicemembers reveal their homosexual relationships or sexual
orientation, they will be discharged. Are there any questions about
this before we move on?
We would like to hear from all of you during this discussion, but
please do not feel like you have to say something for every topic that
we cover. In addition. we do not expect everyone to agree on these
issues. There may be different perspectives on the issues we cover
today, and that's ok - the reason we're here today is because we want
to hear all of those viewpoints. We urge you to be open and honest,
but speaking with the respect and dignity befitting your service. We
would also ask you to please keep crosstalk to a minimum – we
want to be able to hear from all of you who have an opinion to
share, and it can be difficult to sort out conversations if people are
talking over each other.
Finally, although this is not a confidential forum. it is a nonand I will co-lead the discussion and ____
attribution session.
will be helping us to take notes. We will record comments but will
not record names or other identifying information. Only an analysis
and summary of the data will go in our report. And, after you leave
today's session, please do not discuss what was said here with
anyone including the media. This will help us protect the
information shared today. Please turn off cell phones and other
recording devices.
Before we get started, do you have any questions?
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Let's begin with a few general questions about your experiences:
o In your time in the military, how many of you have
served in a unit with someone you believed to be gay or
lesbian? (Moderator notes percentage of the group.)
•

For those of you who have served with someone
you believed to be gay or lesbian, what impact if any - did this have on the functioning of your
unit? Explain. [IF NECESSARY, PROBE: On
the unit's cohesion? On its state of readiness?)

o How many of you have served alongside other militaries
who have integrated gays and lesbians?

•
•

For those of you who have. how do you believe
the integration affected the functioning of those
militaries?
To what extent did your experience affect your
willingness to serve, if gays and lesbians are
integrated into the U.S. military? Please explain.

Issues Associated with Repeal

Time for Issues Associated with
Repeal: 15 minutes

2. Let's now discuss some of the possible issues associated with
repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. You can share how you feel
personally, or if you are uncomfortable doing that, how the
others you have talked to feel about this issue.
o If Don't Ask Don't Tell was repealed, and gays and
lesbians were permitted to serve openly, what effects do
you believe the repeal would have on the U.S. military
overall? Please explain.
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Let's look at some specific areas that might be affected
positively or negatively - or perhaps not at all - by a
repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell.
[MODERATOR-COVER THOSE ISSUES THAT
HAVE NOT ALREADY EMERGED AS A RESULT
OF THE FIRST QUESTION HERE IN SECTION 2]
Unit Operations
■

How do you think a repeal of the law would
affect your unit's morale? Please explain.

▪

How do you think a repeal of the law would
affect your unit's cohesion, for example, their
ability to pull together to get a job done? Please
explain.

▪

How do you think a repeal of the law would
affect the camaraderie among the members of
your unit? Please explain.

▪

How do you think a repeal of the law would
affect your unit's ability to accomplish its
mission? Please explain.

Service Recruitment, Recommendations
▪

How do you think a repeal of the law would
affect the ability of your service to recruit new
service members? Please explain.

▪ If Don't Ask Don't Tell were repealed, to what
extent would that affect your likelihood of
recommending military service to someone who
is considering joining? Please explain.
▪

Do you think that people are going to change
their plans regarding staying in the military, if a
repeal occurs? Please explain.
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Issues to Be Included in Implementation Plan
Time for Implementation
Plan Issues: 15 minutes

3. If the law were to be·repealed, what key issues do you think the
military will need to include in its implementation plan? Please
explain.
[ALLOW PARTICIPANTS TO FREELY EXPRESS
ISSUES; PROBE ON THE ONES LISTED BELOW IF THEY
DO NOT COME UP IN THE COURSE OF CONVERATION
- MOD AND NOTE TAKER SHOULD PAY CLOSE
ATTENTION TO WHICH ISSUES ARISE NATURALLY,
AND WHICH NECESSITATE PROMPTING]
o Religious counseling
o Housing/living quarters
o Confined work areas
o

Superior-subordinate relations

o Dealing with negative reactions to a policy change
o Interpersonal relations in a combat situation
o Benefits
o Integrating gay and lesbian partners into the military
spouse community
•

Of the issues we have discussed [MOD- PROVIDE A
BRIEF LISTI, what do you think should be the first
priority for leaders to address?
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Time for Role of Leadership:
10minutes

4. Now that we have a sense of the issues that may be associated
with repeal, let's examine possible ways in which leadership may
successfully address those issues.
o What efforts on the part of leadership will make the
greatest impact on fostering a command climate that
successfully integrates service members regardless of
sexual orientation?

FACILITATOR MAY PROBE WITH RESPECT TO LEADERS:
•
•
•
•

Ensuring respectful/non•violent treatment of service
members
Affecting non-prejudicial attitudes and
nondiscriminatory behavior
Inspiring unit cohesion
Promoting positive development and training of
subordinates

5. What do you see as key elements of a plan for your service to
successfully adapt to a repeal of the law? FACILITATOR
MAY PROBE WITH RESPECT TO:
•
•
•

Training and education
Fostering cohesion and unit readiness
Enforcing codes of conduct

6. Who has had the greatest influence on your views regarding
Don't Ask, Don't Tell? [Hand out sheet and have participants
check answer to first question.)
7. Who will have the greatest influence in maintaining standards of
conduct and the performance of our units following repeal?
[Second question on handout.)
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Time for Closing Remarks 5minutes

We have discussed several areas that the military and political
leadership should consider when assessing the implications of a
repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell, including how integration will affect
unit operations, the comfort level of straight and gay service
members and their families, as well as actions military leadership
might take to facilitate the integration process. Are there other issues
we should note that have not been addressed already? [ALLOW 5
MINUTES FOR DISCUSSION, AS NEEDED]
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this focus group. As I
mentioned at the beginning, we will treat all of your comments as
non-attribution. We will not link your name to any of the specific
comments you made today. Please also respect that non- attribution
when you leave here today. Our goal is to provide the best data
possible and you have helped us greatly today with your comments
and insights. Thank you again for your participation.
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Handout
Who has had the greatest influence on your views regarding
Don't Ask, Don't Tell? (circle one only)

1.

Family
Friends
Peers
General community
Military leaders within my chain of command
Military leaders outside my chain of command
Other government leaders
Religious leaders (e.g., chaplain, priest, deacon, rabbi, imam,
pastor, clergyman)
o Press
o Social media
o Other (please list here
)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

2.
Who will have the greatest influence in maintaining standards
of conduct and the performance of our units following repeal?
(circle one only)
o
o
o
o

Officer leaders
NCO leaders
Individual Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines
Other (please list here

)
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Appendix E
Westat’s Survey Design Approach to the DoD Survey
and Survey Development Steps (Revised)
We based our design decisions on the following considerations:
•

On a global level, we are trying to keep the tone of the survey
balanced so that respondents can provide feedback on both
positive and negative implications of a possible repeal of the
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy.

•

To understand the effect of a possible repeal of the Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell policy, one must first understand the survey
population’s opinions about the way things are now—for
example, their perceptions about unit cohesion and effectiveness.
Thus, we open the survey with traditional questions asked in
military surveys to provide context and help us to interpret results.
Change is meaningful only if you know what the starting point is.

•

To the extent possible, we tried to limit the number of
assessments of hypothetical behavior. Research, as well as
Westat’s own experience, indicates that data on hypothetical
behavior is often not true or predictive of actual behavior. Other
factors often determine subsequent action. Thus, we separated
questions for respondents who report working with leaders and
coworkers in the military they believe to be gay or lesbian from
questions about potential experiences with leaders and coworkers
they believe to be gay or lesbian. The web mode facilitates
skipping respondents from one question to the next question that
applies to them.

•

We ordered questions related to the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy
such that respondents focus first on their opinions about the Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell policy and their assessment of the effects of a
change in policy. We ask the potentially sensitive questions (such
as questions about sharing close sleeping quarters or shower stall
areas) only after we get the respondents’ answers to the questions
on the effects of a change in policy. This ordering should
minimize the chance that sensitive questions color or influence
responses to questions about the effect of a policy change, if
repealed.
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•

We did not include a question on sexual orientation and thus do
not have self-reported sexual orientation as an explanatory
variable during analysis.

•

We also limit the number of general attitude questions to those
for which responses can be interpreted without ambiguity (for
example, we do not include attitude questions where the same
response may represent a positive attitude for gays or lesbians,
but a negative attitude for heterosexual respondents).

•

We applied best practices in questionnaire design—for example,
(1) writing questions that are clear and unambiguous, are free of
implicit assumptions, and do not ask about more than one topic
per question and (2) using response sets that match the question
wording and are appropriate for analysis.

•

We assessed each question and response set for cognitive
difficulties in understanding and interpreting the questions as
intended and difficulties in answering them. We noted potential
problems for respondents in the draft survey that we will
investigate during the cognitive interviews.

•

We also assessed possible problems in analyzing the collected data
and reporting findings.

•

Because of constantly updated information, we ask basic
demographic questions in the survey to get the most current and
accurate data available from the respondents themselves. The
demographic data will be confidential, not anonymous.

Our survey development process has included the following steps:
•

We reviewed the literature, the item bank provided by the
CRWG, other existing military surveys, other surveys on the
survey topic, and the CRWG’s priority measurement goals.

•

We prepared an initial draft of the survey.

•

We conducted 20 cognitive interviews with 20 military service
members to pretest the draft survey.

•

We circulated the draft survey for review to and input from
CRWG members, Survey Team and Service Research (ISSCC)
representatives.
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•

We revised the draft survey in response to findings from the
cognitive interviews and comments from reviewers. We
identified potential problems to investigate during the second
round of cognitive interviews.

•

We mapped the questions to the CRWG’s survey priorities and
principles (see attached file) and made some additional changes.

•

Survey was then staffed to the CRWG Co-chairs and Service
Personnel Chiefs for further comments that were then
incorporated in the current draft. Substantive comments that
were not incorporated were reviewed and adjudicated with the
Service that made the comment.
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